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First 2 lial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2005-0019431 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Finnicum, Peggy Jean 
User: ORElLLY 
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicum 
Date Code User Judge 
9/26/2005 NEWC MCCANDLESS New Case Filed BAC .26.25 To Be Assigned 
BNDS 
NODF 
AFPC 
ADFS 
ORPC 
HRSC 
9/29/2005 N ANG 
DRQD 
DMSC 
MNLl 
MNSP 
9/30/2005 HRVC 
PLNG 
10/6/2005 PRSD 
PRQD 
10/18/2005 MOTN 
10/28/2005 ADMR 
HRSC 
MCCANDLESS Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 1000.00 ) 
MCCANDLESS Notice To Defendant 
MCCANDLESS Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
MCCANDLESS Advisory Form & Notice Of Suspension 
MCCANDLESS Order Finding Probable Cause 
MCCANDLESS Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial 
Conference/Arraignment 1011 112005 08:30 AM) 
MCCANDLESS Notice of Pretrial Conference 
CARROLL Notice of Appearance, Plea of Not Guilty & 
Demand For Jury Trial 
CARROLL Defendant's Request For Discovery 
CARROLL Demand For Sworn Complaint 
CARROLL Motion In Limine 
CARROLL Motion To Suppress 
CARROLL Hearing result for Pre-Trial 
ConferenceIArraignment held on 1011 112005 
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
CARROLL Plea Of Not Guilty 
JOKELA Plaintiffs Response To Request for Discovery 
JOKELA Plaintiffs Request For Discovery 
MOLLETT Amended Motion To Suppress 
MITCHELL Administrative assignment of Judge 
MITCHELL Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
12/23/2005 10:30 AM) 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
Eugene A. Marano 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
To Be Assigned 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
HRSC MITCHELL Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Penny E. Friedlandel 
01/09/2006 08:30 AM) 1/9-1113 
STRS 
1 111 12005 MNDQ 
1 1/3/2005 DlSA 
11/14/2005 HRSC 
NOHG 
11/29/2005 SUBF 
SUBF 
12/9/2005 SUBF 
12/15/2005 HRHD 
MITCHELL 
MITCHELL 
CARROLL 
MITCHELL 
CRUSH 
JOKELA 
JREYNOLDS 
JREYNOLDS 
MO'REILLY 
HAMILTON 
Notice of Pre-Trial Conference and Trial Penny E. Friedlander 
Speedy Trial Limit Satisfied Penny E. Friedlander 
Motion To Disqualify - Eugene A Marano Eugene A. Marano 
Disqualification Of Judge Marano - Automatic Eugene A. Marano 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to SuppresslLimine Penny E. Friedlander 
12/15/2005 04:OO PM) LOATS 20 MIN 
Notice Of Hearing Penny E. Friedlander 
Subpoena Returnlfound Shane T Vrevich Penny E. Friedlander 
Subpoena Returnlfound Jonathan Mcfarland Penny E. Friedlander 
Subpoena Returnlfound-Arthur M Finnicum Penny E. Friedlander 
Hearing result for Motion to SuppresslLimine held Penny E. Friedlander 
on 12/15/2005 04:OO PM: Hearing Held LOATS 
20 MIN 
Date: 6/5/2007 
Time: 07:57 AM 
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First J ial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2005-0019431 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Finnicurn, Peggy Jean 
User: OREILLY 
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicurn 
Date Code User Judge 
1211 912005 PNTS CRUSH Points And Authorities from Fred Loats Penny E. Friedlander 
12/23/2005 HRHD CRUSH Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on Penny E. Friedlander 
12/23/2005 10:30 AM: Hearing Held 
CONT CRUSH Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Penny E. Friedlander 
01/09/2006 08:30 AM: Continued 119-1113 
WAlV CRUSH Waiver Of Speedy Trial Penny E. Friedlander 
12/29/2005 HRSC CRUSH Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Penny E. Friedlander 
02/21/2006 08:30 AM) 2-22 TO 2-24 
1/12/2006 PBRF 
1/13/2006 HRSC 
112312006 SUBF 
1 12512006 SUBF 
SUBF 
2/3/2006 HRHD 
2/21/2006 HRVC 
MOTN 
CRUSH 
CRUSH 
CRUSH 
CRUSH 
THOMAS 
THOMAS 
THOMAS 
CRUSH 
CRUSH 
CRUSH 
Notice of Hearing Penny E. Friedlander 
Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition of Motion to Penny E. Friedlander 
Suppress 
Hearing Scheduled (Decision 02/03/2006 08:30 Penny E. Friedlander 
AM) ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Notice of Hearing Penny E. Friedlander 
Subpoena Returnlfound Arthur Finnicurn Penny E. Friedlander 
01-19-06 
Subpoena Returnlfound--Shane Vrevich Penny E. Friedlander 
Subpoena Returnlfound--Jonathan Mcfarland Penny E. Friedlander 
Hearing result for Decision held on 02/03/2006 Penny E. Friediander 
08:30 AM: Hearing Held ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS - MOTION DENIED 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Penny E. Friedlander 
02/21/2006 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 2-22 
TO 2-24 
Motion to Set for Disposition Penny E. Friedlander 
2/27/2006 HRSC CRUSH Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 04/28/2006 Penny E. Friedlander 
03:OO PM) 
CRUSH Notice of Hearing 
4/27/2006 NOHG MCCANDLESS Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Penny E. Friedlander 
Penny E. Friedlander 
4/28/2006 CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Sentencing held on 04/28/2006 Penny E. Friedlander 
03:OO PM: Continued 
5/4/2006 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 07/13/2006 Penny E. Friedlander 
01:30 PM) 30 MIN 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing Penny E. Friedlander 
711 012006 MOTN CRUSH Motion to Continue Sentencing Penny E. Friedlander 
ORDR CRUSH Order to Continue Sentencing Penny E. Friedlander 
CONT CRUSH Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/13/2006 Penny E. Friedlander 
01:30 PM: Continued 30 MIN 
HRSC CRUSH Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 07/21/2006 Penny E. Friedlander 
04:15 PM) 
7/21/2006 HRVC HAMILTON Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/21/2006 Penny E. Friedlander 
04:15 PM: Hearing Vacated AND MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
002 
Date: 6/5/2007 
Time: 07:57 AM 
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First .f :ial District Court - Kootenai County/ 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2005-0019431 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Finnicum. Peggy Jean 
User: OREILLY 
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicum 
Date Code User Judge 
7/21/2006 G L N  HAMILTON Conditional Plea of Guilty Penny E. Friedlander 
ORDR 
STDR 
BNDE 
GLTY 
SNPF 
PROB 
JDMT 
SPRO 
7/24/2006 APDC 
MOTN 
APDC 
7/25/2006 ADMR 
STAT 
ORDR 
712612006 EST1 
8/14/2006 BNDC 
8/31/2006 MlSC 
911 412006 NLTR 
LODG 
BNDV 
BNDV 
911 512006 RECT 
912 112006 RECT 
9/25/2006 BRFA 
HAMILTON 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RICKARD 
RlCKARD 
RICKARD 
RlCKARD 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
MORELAND 
RICKARD 
CLAUSEN 
CAMPBELL 
MORELAND 
CARROLL 
CAMPBELL 
CAMPBELL 
CAMPBELL 
CAMPBELL 
HAMILTON 
MCCANDLESS 
Order Approving and Accepting Conditional Plea Penny E. Friedlander 
of Guilty 
Statement Of Defendant's Rights -- DUI John P. Luster 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 1,000.00) John P. Luster 
Guilty Plea Or Admission Of Guilt - GT John P. Luster 
(118-8004(1)(A)(.20) {M) Driving Under The 
lnfluence (excessive)) 
Sentenced To Pay Fine (118-8004(1)(A)(.20) {M) John P. Luster 
Driving Under The Influence (excessive)) 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004(1)(A)(.20) John P. Luster 
{M) Driving Under The lnfluence (excessive)) 
Confinement terms: Jail: 365 days. Suspended 
jail: 315 days. Discretionary: 30 days. 
Probation Ordered (118-8004(1)(A)(.20) {M) John P. Luster 
Driving Under The lnfluence (excessive)) 
Probation term: 2 years. (Supe~iSed) 
Judgment John P. Luster 
Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order John P. Luster 
Appeal Filed In District Court Penny E. Friedlander 
Motion for stay of execution of sentencing Penny E. Friedlander 
pending appeal 
Appeal Filed In District Court Penny E. Friedlander 
Administrative assignment of Judge John P. Luster 
Case status changed: closed pending clerk John P. Luster 
action 
Order Staying Execution of the Sentence Penny E. Friedlander 
Pending Appeal 
Estimate Of Transcript Costs John P. Luster 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 709196 Dated John P. Luster 
8/14/2006 for 130.00)Law Library transcript 
PROBATIONER STATUS John P. Luster 
Notice of Lodging Transcript - Motion to John P. Luster 
Suppress and Oral Decision 
Lodged Transcript - Motion to Suppress and Oral John P. Luster 
Decision 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 9493510 John P. Luster 
dated 9/14/2006 amount 117.00) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 949351 1 John P. Luster 
dated 9/14/2006 amount 13.00) 
Receipt Of Transcript Motion To Suppress And John P. Luster 
Oral Decision 
Receipt Of Transcript John P. Luster 
Brief Of Appellant John P. Luster 003 
Date: 6/5/2007 
Time: 07:57 AM 
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First .' 'sial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2005-0019431 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Defendant: Finnicum, Peggy Jean 
User: OREILLY 
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicum 
Date Code User Judge 
1011 212006 NOTS CAMPBELL Notice Of Settling Transcript On Appeal John P. Luster 
1011 712006 STAT WATKINS Case status changed: reopened John P. Luster 
HRSC WATKINS Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 02/01/2007 John P. Luster 
03:30 PM) 
BRFR 
BRIE 
INHD 
OBJT 
MOTN 
MEMO 
ORDR 
ORDR 
APSC 
REMT 
RM AN 
RMAN 
ORDR 
HRSC 
HRVC 
N APL 
WATKINS Notice of Hearing 
MCCANDLESS Brief Of Respondent 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
MCCANDLESS Reply Brief John P. Luster 
BOOTH Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on John P. Luster 
02/01/2007 03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
MCCANDLESS Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order on John P. Luster 
Appeal 
BOOTH Motion for reconsideration notice of hearing John P. Luster 
BOOTH Memorandum in support of motion for John P. Luster 
reconsideration 
BOOTH Order on appeal John P. Luster 
BOOTH Order on Appeal John P. Luster 
OREILLY Appealed To The Supreme Court John P. Luster 
WATKINS Remittitur John P. Luster 
WATKINS Remanded John P. Luster 
WATKINS Remanded Penny E. Friedlander 
OREILLY *******+** ACCOUNT IS IN Penny E. Friedlander 
COLLECTIONS*"****"** - Step 1, Failure to Pay 
Fines and Fees - Charge # 1, Driving Under The 
Influence (excessive) Appearance date: 
4/3/2007 
WATKINS Order Rescinding Remittitur John P. Luster 
CRUSH Hearing Scheduled (Hearing After Appeal Penny E. Friedlander 
0411 912007 08:30 AM) 20 min 
CRUSH Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
CRUSH Hearing result for Hearing After Appeal held on Penny E. Friedlander 
04/19/2007 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 20 min 
OREILLY Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court John P. Luster 
- 
''  ' 94468  *. KOOTENAI COUNTY c ~ n ~ a c t c i ~ o f  
0 HAYDEN 0 FERNAN - OTHER m~~ EPT. 0 DALTON GAUD. Cl HUETTER NSTRICT --%-.-- 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 1 ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF a
STATE OF IDAHO 1 COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS 
vs. ) Infraction Citation 
/ = m d ~ ~ C ~ h / \  ) OR w 
a iae ~ s m e  ) a Misdemeanor Citation - 
d 1 PE; eeu 3~4a ) U Acctdent Involved d Fml ~ e m e  ~ i ~ t e  bde l  • Cornpanton Cttatton 
07 Attached 
IPUC # USDOT TK Census # I 
Operator 0 Class A [Zl Class 5 Cf Class C B C l a s s  D Other, 
C7 GVWR 26001 + C7 16+ persons C7 Placard Hazardous Mater 1s DRI~  + 25 I 3 3 
I 
Home Address /%2G;! h) hoe,Qf lTCIIL) bk - . b-6~ ~~tui.s.63 S3664 
Business Address C E U ~ ~ & ' V M W ,  ~ _ I Y ~ Q ~ L  Phone # =(3-?)3* 
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS:. - 
rounds, and belleve the above-named Defendant, 
DL or SS# S t a l e I ~  a~ 
t i e l g h t r S ; \  Wt  Hatr Eyes -&&.- DOB 
Veh La  # k a  BG7 (i State fD Yr of Veh~cle w ~ a k e  C M U  ! 
Model l&7 f ,  -P 
Dld comrntt the following act@) on =:  0 at -L!,&&d o'clock - P M 
Vio. #1 J h G 6 6 Z  1%- E ~ Y ( c )  
CWe seetion 
Vio. #2 
Cod@ S ~ l l 0 "  
1. x 
OfftcedParty 
36 
Ser~al #/Address Dept 
Date Wltnesstng Offlcer Senal #/Address Dept 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT I 
Dlstrict Court of KOOTENAl '/ILENE Idaho. 
on the day of 
, 20 - .at o'clock - M 
1 I acknowledge receipt of this summons and I promise to appear at the time indicated. 
Z Oelendsnt s Signature 
"2 
t I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on 
m 
.20- 
v 
C 
2 Gilicer ! 
NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
COURT COPY VIOLATION #I 
Departmental Report # 0 - 25 \ 5 3 
~ 5 - i  
?@) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF?@&&?'&,&$ 9: 26 . 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
F-i,k!NiCk~,?&@eY 3 ~ d  , 
DOB
SSN 
DL# 
State 
State of Idaho, 
County of KCnrC~~l t -7  
COURT CASE NUMBER CM/O~$ '\q 31 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF WARRANTLESS ARREST AND /OR REFUSAL TO 
SUBMIT TO / FAILURE OF EVIDENTIARY TEST 
I, W?. 3%.  M%A t ~ ~ r r S 3  , the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says 
that: (print) 
1. I am a peace officer employed by ! ~ 'Dc ,~F~J /~z  a, 3Q.
2. The defendant was arrested on ~ / ~ s / D s  at &% ClAM WPM for the offense (s) IC /S-%C~3'1(c> 
~ X C E S S  TOE hu T , 
and /or of driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating pursuant to Section 18-8004 
Idaho Code. 
Second or more DUI offense in the last five years? ClYES haNO ClFELONY CiqMISDEMEANOR 
3. Location of Occurrence: 4/ % Z \C+ - 
4. Identified the defendant as: (print name) FT  M ,QZCh k P E ~ C  Y 3 E R h )  by: (check box) 
ClMilitary ID ClState ID Card OStudent ID Card b ~ r i v e r s  License ClCredit Cards 
ElPapexwork found BVerbal ID by defendant 
Witness FTN?\llcu.rv\. Ak-r&.tR . MW$& L- identified defendant. 
Other 
5. Actual physical control established by: &Observation by affiant q Observation by Officer 
U Admission of Defendant to , Cl Statement of Witness: 
0 Other: 
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because of the following 
facts: (NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed and 
what you learned fiom someone eIse, identifying that person): 
006 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST: f)& o'i/15/& 5 47 ~ 3 P b z .  /%a\ URS 2 \A> \<  <WJC 
, 
R M . F T N U ~ ~ M  7!f( h u h k  - 6 / 4 7 5  go N 47 -.c J GN~, O ~ $ / Z S  bfIiOirui&Y 
U N F C W  3&51 L G W  7M- /~MZ~>&&? bd~vr&:c? A Ulr)-LTc ?t&V'i &L+~+R- 
. + R ~ I \  942 0 Th'eTsK- w 4s bPWkZu b A-I/_R!+oL'J I 
onevzhm &L &&A= 11 N N Z G  I W& - S ~ A - I C ~ ~ J  e TD PCge'i i)fir,\x u p - ,n 7 4 ~  PFWDFNCC 
a10 .A h 1 3  UL R&~L\%~\-I  C%I%RVZL&J bk.) CDOL~) 54 
D.U. I. NOTES ' +6R  @iw7/r. 1 $40 E8KV Do I%dT.s .&b 
Odor of alcoholic beverage d e s  ONO Gaze Nystagmus m e s  ClNo 
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage m e s  ONo Walk & Turn [TYkes ONo 
Slurred speech ClNo One Leg Stand ET'es ClNo 
hpaired memory El'&: ClNo 
Glassy/bloodshot eyes &es ONO Accident Involved UYes d o  
Other Inju,ry Dyes &o 
Drugs Suspected a y e s  d o  Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed UYes !3%o 
Reason Drugs are Suspected .#/A 
Prior to testing, defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and failure of the test as 
required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code. 
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test (s) waslwere 
performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004(4) Idaho Code and the standards and methods adopted 
by the Department of Law Enforcement. 
by: RBreath Instrument Type:Wntoxilyzer 5000 OAlco Sensor Instrument Serial #d6-3~&1 
ClBlood And/or ClUrine Test Results Pending? Yes  NO (Attached) 
Name of person administering breath test:~b.T,k. M4 FARUMb Date Certification Expires: 04. /30 /07 
Defendant refused the test as follows: 
- 
By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby 
solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached reports and documents that may be 
included herein is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. 
Dated: cS=l/~s/&j' Signed: i)GP, J .h. W' F h R W D  
(affiant) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on -0 
, , , \ ! \ I ~ ~ I I I ~ ,  (Date) 
,\\ 6. G R F ~ ' / / ,  
," 0.. .. .-.. 
3 .  .O 5 (or) 5 p 2 2 5 6  
PERSON AUTHORIZGD TP;.LOTARY.. . 5 NOTARY PUBLIC ~ 7 0 ~  IDAHO 
, = ADMINISTEROAT@. , .- . - 
- 
- .  
. - Title: - . B, . - 
- 
- .  * 
. . 
Residing at: k'Cs0 - &, 
. 4 f I . l ~  
'$7 '. . My Commission expires: 
',/%+. ...... "+O .$- 
//, E OF \o!,\' 
' ~ 1 1 1  I , \ \ \  
007 
Accepted by: 2 2  7 
Agency Report # 0 S -25 I 3 ? 
BAC .ad I ,2c 
Warrant Check 
Prob. Check 
Prob. Officer 
Locker # 3 CIA 
Location 
Hold For: 
For DUI Charge: 
Was Call Requested 
Was Call Made 
i ;-BOOKING INFORMATION Sh,-.. . 
Booking # KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY BUILDING 
Name ID # Date 09 /x,/o C; 
ARRESTEE: 
Name F1hIb-J \' ZC .!A p ~ ~ e v  
Last 
564 N 
Firs1 Middle 
AKA 
Address /ti 2; 3 3). I ~ ~ C C Z ~ ~ L F - W  b R . 
City ) ) Q ~ T  rAL( S ST h-b Zip C638S C( 
Home Phone 773 -7399 - S
CityIState of Birth Ailh)l l&~, M T  DOB ~mpio~er(@ 'J4U C-Y 
D.L. # e~a06296  b State LD Occupation TF&\t&lL Work Phone #SCF(-u%-Y\&) 
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: 
Height 5 (1 " weight& S e x F   air- ~ ~ e s m  
Race Ld Glasses Y @ Contacts Y /@ Facial Hair PA 
Scars, Marks, Tattoo's .%AIL aU L G = T  5 ; b c  os ~ A , &  ~ - 6 4 - K  E Y L  
Clothing Description 4? LL& P 4 d  ;S @KC"-( d ~64?6ti3~Ic?.T 
ARRESTING OFFICER INFORMATION: 
Date I Time of Arrest O~/Z/OS 1 17 I qq iocationl68L 3 7 .  x-LUX3-A Dk. Dist 'i I 
Arresting Officer k?. 5  n. M%&ILI .&dl) !: 235C) Agency K G  l) Arrival at PSB /q/? 
Is the arresting officer aware oi any menral or pnys~ca! conditions this inmate may have which might affect hisiher safety or 
ability to be held without special attention oy jail staff? No, d y e s  (Explain) 74&3 ? b ~ ,  , - x i t - T m  
r,;7< G F T  & 
VEHICLE INFORMATION: 
- , - - 
qenlc;e ~ j c .  Ki63 iod Y w a k e  C H Y  Model UitZC+? ?day ? l)P- Co~or(s)jJ>tlETG 
V~hlcie Disposition &fi - 7 g  c-69 4.7 2.2 & &  /%% . .. LL'. 2-m-nCl i(i.j QR. &37-D 
CITIZEN ARREST: i hereby arrest the a ~ o v e  named suspect on the chargels) indicated and request a peace 
JAIL SiRt i  355 iiev : liO? 
8 
KOOTENAI COUNTY JAIL 
INTOXILYZER - ALCOHOL ANALYZER 
SN 66-003460 
09/25/2005 SOLUTION LOT NO. 
SUB NAME= EGGY,J 
SUB DOB 
O.L.N.=ID/GT206286B 
OPER NAME=MCFARLAND,JON,R 
ARREST AGENCY=2800 
TEST 
AIR BLANK 
INTERNAL STANDARDS 
AIR BLANK 
SIM CHK #0023 
ACCEPTABLE 
AIR BLANK 
SUBJECT TEST 
AIR BLANK 
SUBJECT TEST 
AIR BLANK 
BrAC 
.oo 
PASSED 
.oo 
.075 
TIME 
19:49 PDT 
1950 PDT 
19:50 PDT 
19:51 PDT 
19:51 PDT 
19:52 PDT 
19:52 PDT 
19:53 PDT 
19:53 PDT 
ocj/a.s/os - Pci2-5 
TIME FIRST OBSERVED 
KOOTENAt COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPAR I MENT 
ADDITIONAL PROPERTY1 NARRATIVE CONTINUATION 
1 I I Video Cassette. Maxell T-120. black, standard VHS, contact with (5) Peggy J Finnicum, start of tape: 
I 18:17- end of tape. , 
1) (WIRP) Finnicum, Arthur Michael, WIM, 01104186,18363 W. Riverview Dr. Post Falls, ID 83854,773-7849. 
(M) Dep. S. Vrevich, KCSD, 2359. 
I 
' 2) On the public roadway located on Riverview Dr., cross of Pleasant View Rd., near the City of Post Falls, 1 / Kootenai County, State of Idaho 83854. 
I I I 3) On 09/25/05 at approx. 1756 hours I along with (M) Dep. Vrevich were dispatched to respond to a possible 
domestic dispute at 18363 W. Riverview Dr. While enroute to the call Dispatch notified us that the female half 
had left the scene driving a white Chevy Blazer and was possibly intoxicated. Dep. Vrevich was checking the 
I 
area and also advised Post Falls of a possible intoxicated driver. I arrived on scene at approx. 1810 hours 
were I met, (WIRP) Arthur M. Finnicum. Arthur and his girlfriend were waiting at the top of his driveway on 
Riverview Rd. to speak with me reference the possible domestic dispute. 
Arthur said that he and his mother, (S) Peggy J. Finnicum got into a verbal argument earlier that evening 
because Arthur believed that she needed to stop drinking. Arthur said that Peggy got upset and said, "Fuck 
you!" repeatedly. Arthur said he did not know what to do so he called his father for advice. Arthur said his 
father told him to call the police. Arthur said when he called the police Peggy left the house driving her white 
Chevy Blazer. Arthur said that Peggy had been drinking alcoholic beverages all day and he believed that she 
was highly intoxicated. 
While I was speaking to Arthur at approx. 182f hours, I saw Peggy drive up in her white Chevy Blazer 
travelling eastbound on Riverview Dr. I flagged Peggy down and told her to pull into the driveway so I could 
speak to her. While I was speaking to her I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath. 
I advised her to drive down the driveway in a safe area so I could do some further investigation. Peggy was 
slurr~ng her speech, had glassy and blood shot eyes, and seemed confused. 
I asked Peggy to step out of the vehicle. Peggy stepped out of the vehicle. I told Peggy to stay by her car so I 
could speak to Arthur. Peggy continued to say, 'What are you doing here" I advised Peggy that I was here to 
investigate a domestic dispute between her and her son, Arthur. l also advised Peggy that she appeared to be 
tntoxtcated and she was driving her vehicle on a public roadway. 
While 1 was speaktng to Arthur. Peggy went tnto the house. Dep. Vrevich arrived on scene to assist me in my 
investigation. I advised Dep. Vrevich that Peggy went into the house when she was told to stay outside. Dep. 
Vrevlch and I entered the house through the front door to reestablish contact with Peggy. 
Peggy said that she did not know what was gotng on and she said she did not know what was wrong with her 
drivrng her vehicle after she had a couple of drinks. Peggy said that she went to the Stateline to buy a pack of 
ctgarettes and came back home. I told Peggy that I believed that she was Intoxicated and that I would need to 
do some Standardized Field Sobriety Tests on her. Peggy agreed and I conducted the following tests an a 
level gravel driveway outside of Peggy's home 
-. 
rudY U S  TSA : ~SiTirrE.l~=nu*. 
Dep. J.R McFarland 
01 0 
KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPAR I MENT 
ADDITIONAL PROPERTY/ NARRATIVE CONTINUATION 
yesterday evening. I asked Peggy if she had any head injuries, eye problems, or physical disabilities. Peggy 
advised me that she did not have any head injuries or eye problems, however she said that her left knee was 
injured and that she was under a physician's care for it. I asked Peggy if she was able to walk. Peggy said 
that she was able to walk, however she said that her knee causes her to be off balance. 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Peggy said that she could see the tip of my finger and she understood my 
instructions. Peggy started to move her head during the evaluations and I advised her not to move her head 
and follow the tip of my finger with her eyes and her eyes only. Both eyes tracked equally. Both eyes lacked 
smooth pursuit and showed distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation. Both eyes showed 
nystagmus prior to onset of 45 degrees. I also noticed that Peggy's eyes were glassy and bloodshot. I Walk and Turn: As l was explaining the walk and turn to Peggy she said that she could not stand with her right 
1 foot in front of her left foot because of her bad knee. I advised Peggy to do the best that she could and not to 
' start the test until I told her to do so. Peggy was swaying back and forth during the instruction phase and 
I continued to speak while I was giving my instructions. Peggy said that she understood the instructions. 
I Peggy stepped off line a total of four times, did not touch heel to toe on any of the steps, she also did not 
make a proper turn, and she had her hands raised from her sides during the entire test. 
I 
i One Leg Stand: Peggy said that she understood my instructions. Peggy again said that she could not do the 1 
i test due to her knee injury. I advised Peggy that if her left leg was injured she needed to place that leg in the i 
i air and stand on her good leg. Peggy fell of balance two times, raised her arms from her sides, and dropped 
: her foot at least nine times. Peggy was unable to finish the test. i 
! 
, Based on my investigation I placed Peggy under arrest for IC 18-8004 Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
I 
I transported Peggy to PSB. I read Peggy the 18-8002 Advisory Form. Peggy submitted two breath tests on ' 
the lntoxilyzer 5000. Peggy's BAC was 261.25. I read Peggy her Miranda Right's and she said that she did not 
want to talk to me. I stopped the interview. 
I charged Peggy with IC 18-8004(C) Excessive Driving Under the lnfluence of Alcohol, due to the BAC of 
261.25. Cite number 94468. 
Attached to the report is a voluntary statement form, filled out by Arthur. The vehicle was not towed and left at 
the registered owners home. The VHS tape was entered into KCSD Evidence. 
5 )  Radio Call/ Observation 
6) None 
d l  
/ Dep. J.R. McFartand 
KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM  
REPORTNO: 05- 35/33 INCIDE T A - 6  -?ME: 
LOCATION: I ? ?  L'?, W. kid@ bl* bt? a5s$hA.5,, .%383 
PERSONS PRESENT: a ~ l , > a  b~+f: Ri<<, u d ;  i 0 .-oS- 1195 0% @ \)s - 7 '  
' ELJZCI&&-\ 21cLiWbi 
NAME: ~ 4 ~ s -  $,6%,n) - 59 I /?g'fj 
ADDRESS: 1 mA> R * ~ P I ~  u r f ' ~  
HOME PHONE: (a) ->74-*q WORK PHONE: (&@a??$, 161 \ OTHER PHONE: (a@ 644% !5&. 
declare that on the 2.q day of 
I 
i 
/ 
f l  / 
-. 1 / ../ 
Y ,' 
AA i',/ 
I 
/ 
I ,y, )' 
4A!7 
/ 
I.;., / 
\ \  "7 
/ 
/ I 
! 
I give &is of my own will. There have norhrears or promisu made to me ior rhc making o i t h ~ s  ul:m:nt, I auest that ;: :> :n: , 
uurh to the ben of my knowledge. 1 undnnand &at any pmon who knowingly gives a false T o n  10 an" peacr oficcr docs so in violation o i  icnne ! 
Code sccr~on 18-705. -,. -- 
- \ .* .- 1 
-??%a -. :.y-p\ - -, ,, 
I date i 
e4 -z?d&F I ldarcl 1 
Mailing Address 
2. You are required by law to take one or more evidentiary tests to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or  other intoxicating 
substances in your body, After submitting to the test(s) you may, when practical, at your own expense, have additional tests made by a person of your 
3. You do not have the right to talk to a lawyer before taking any evidentiary tests to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in your body. 
4. If you refuse to take or complete any of the offered tests pursuant to Section 18-8002, ldaho Code: 
A. Your ldaho driver's license or permit will he seized if you have it in your possession, and if it is current and valid you will be issued a temporary 
permit. Non-resident licenses will not be seized and will be valid in Idaho for thirty (30) days from the service of this notice of suspension unless 
modified or restricted by the court, provided the license is valid in the issuing state. If you were operating a commercial motor vehicle, any 
temporary permit issued will not provide commercial driving privileges of any kind. 
B. You have a right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the Magistrate Court of@%TWkr County for a hearing to show cause 
why you refused to submit to or complete evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not be suspended. 
C. IP you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, your license will be suspended by the court with absolutely no driving privileges for 
180 days if this is your first refusal; if this is not your first refusal in the last five years, your license will be suspended with absolutely no driving 
privileges for one (1) year. 
5.  if you take and fail the evidentiary test(s) pursuant to Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code: 
B. I will serve you with this NOTICE O F  SUSPENSIONthat becomes effective thirty days from the date of service on this NOTICE, suspending 
your driver's License orprivileges. If this is your first failure of an evidentiary test your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for 
ninety (90) days, with absoiukely no driving privileges during the first thirty (30) days. You may request restricted driving privileges for the 
remaining sixty (60) days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow you to operate a commercial motor vehicle. If this is not 
your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five (5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for one (1) year 
with absolutely no driving privileges of any kind during that period. 
C. You have the right to an administrative hearing on the suspension before the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT to show cause why 
you failed the evidentiary test and why your driver's license should not be suspended. The request must be made in writing and be received by the 
department within seven (7) calendar days from the date of service of this NOTICE OF SLISPEiVSION. You also have the right to judicial review 
of the Hearing Officer's decision. 
( S )  IS SEPARATE 
A permit was not issued because the license was: D Suspended m o t  in Possession 0 Invalid 
Expired O Issued by Another Jurisdiction Not Licensed 
ORDER FINDING PROBABLE CAUSqqrr, qFp 26 kv : 27 
1 * -  t 
The above-named defendant having been arrested without a warrant fo [a* xc  ~S-%OclY ~ ~ G 6 6 2 ~ ) ~  D c h ~ .  IieM 
J 
and the Court having examined the &davit of b ~ 3 . 5  .k. MC-FAALA~~ , the Court finds 
probable cause for believing that said crime(s) has been committed and that the defendant committed said 
crime(s), and that helshe may be requirego post bail prior to being released. 
DATED this 2@ d a y o f w  . 2 0 / , F  . 
TIME: AMPM 
Y 
SHR #9 REV0412001 
FREDERICK G LO&TS PAGE 07 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Aftorney at Law 
111 North 2nd Streel, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 831 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-6424 
Fmr (208)664-3644 
ISB No. 2147 
Attorney for Defendant 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THF, FIRST JLJDICZAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-MOS-1943 1 
1 Citation No. 
VS. 1 
1 MOTION IN LTMME 
PEGGY JEAN F'INNICUM, 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
\ 
Defendant hereby moves the Court for an Order excluding from cvidence at trial the breath 
tests conducted upon the Defendant, including any testimony relating thereto, by and for the reason 
that the oficer administering said tests Failed to follow prescribed procedure prior to collecting 
breath samples from the Defendant, thereby rendering the results unreliable and inadmissable. 
DATED this date of &. ,2005. 
L, 
FREDERICK G. LOATS I 
MOTION IN LIWlNE -I 
FREDERICK G LOkTS 
CERTJ,FICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certtfy that on this day o f  #. ,2005, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or interoffice mail to: 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
by fax 
L, 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
PREDERTCK G. LOATS 
Attorney at Law 
I l l  North Second Street 
P. 0. Box 83 I 
Coeur &lone, Idaho 83816-0831 
Telephone: (208) 667-6424 
Fax: (208) 664-3644 
ISB No. 2147 
FREDERICK G LOATS PkGE 09 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN TI-IE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICML DISTRICT OF T I E  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-~05-19431 
Plaintiff, 1 Citation No. 
1 
VS. 1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 1 
j 1 Defendant. ) 
Defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(3), ICR, hereby moves the Court for an 
Order suppressing any and all evidencc acquired as aresult of the initial dctention of the Defendant, 
the subsequent dctention of the Defendant, the search of the Defendant's vehicle. and any evidence 
acquired as a result of the subsequcnt arrest of the Defendant, including evidentiary testing and/or 
any post-arrest statements, by and for the fallowing reasons: 
I. The initial detention was not supported by a reasonable, &iculable suspicion that 
criminal activity was occurring or had occurred, and therefore was in violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article One, g17 of the Idaho 
Constitution; 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS - I 
FREDERICK G LObTS 
2. The subsequent detention of the Defendant was the product of this unconstitutional 
stop; 
3. The Defendant's subsequent arrest not supported by probable cause, and therefore 
was in violation of the Fourll~ and Fourteenth Amendnlents to the United States Consti,tution and 
Article One, $17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The detention of the Defendant, the arrest of the Defendant, and any evidence acquired as a 
rcsult of t11.e Defendant's arrest, including any evidentia~y testing and/or post-a-arrest statements 
attributed to the Defendant, were therefore obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and M c l e  One, 5 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
DATED this 27 date of && ,2005. 
Ld 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of &&. ,2005, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was mailed postage-prepaid addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
I by fic~ 
L r  
FREDERICK 0. LOATS . 
I MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 2 
I 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney at Law 
111 North Second Street, Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 831 
Coeur d'AZene, Idaho 83816-0831 
Telephone: (208) 667-6424 
F a :  (208)664-3644 
ISB No. 2147 
FREDERICK G LOATS PAGE 01 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 05-  / qy3/ 
Case No. CR-Mr- ' -' -- 
Plaintiff, 1 
) AMENDED 
VS. 1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
PEGGY J. FINNICUM, 
1 
1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(3), ICR, by way of supplementation to 
hcr previous1 y filed Motion to Supprcss, raises the following additional challenge to the searches and 
seizures that occurred in this case, to wit: 
1. The peace officers unlawfully and unconstitutionally entered the defendant's home 
and removed hcr &om her home, during the course of their contact with the defendant. This entry 
was not pursuant to either a search or arrest warrant, and not pursuant to any exception to the warrant 
requirement, and therefore unconstitutional, and any evidence acquired as a result must bc 
i 
I suppressed. 
DATED this $ date of % ,2005. 
w t* 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney for Defendant 
I AMENDED MOTIaN TO SUPPRESS - 1 
FREDERICK G LOATS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the .& day of a- ,2005, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was mailed postage-prepaid addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, Interoffice Mail 
rr * w &.LA 
FREDERICK G. LOA XS 
AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 2 
11/01/2005 15:50 12086643644 FREDERICK G LOCTS PAGE 05 
STAX @ IukiG l(j ss 
COUNTY OF K E T E M  J 
TILED: 
FREDERICK 0. ZOATS 
Attorney at Lmn, 
111 North Second Street, Sne. 300 
P. 0. Box 831 
Coeur d'Alenc, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208)667-6424 
F': (208) 664-3644 
ISB No. 2147 
Attorncy for Defendant 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
1 
1 Case No. CR-05-1943 1 
VS. 
1 
1 
1 MO TZON TO DISQUALIFY 
PEGGY JEAN FQWXCUM, 1 WTHOUT CAUSE 
1 
Defendant. ) 
1 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 25(a), I.C.R., Defendant hereby moves for d ~ e  
disqualification of the Honorable Eugene A. Maratlo from presiding as Judge in ale above elltided 
action. 
. w L ,  
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
WITHOUT U USE - 1 
FREDERICK G LObTS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1, hereby certify that on. the ) day of November, 2005, a truc and correct copy of the 
foregoing was sent addressed to: 
Resident Chambers of Honorable Eugene A. Marano 
Magistrate Judge 
324 W. Garden Avenue 
Coeur d7Alene, Idaho 838 14 
Kootenai Prosecuting Attorney, by fax 
L I 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
WITHOUT U W E  - 2 
Case # ire - ~ 5 -  lqli3 / 
Charge(s) 
i 
I &rn.lJ d b , ~ & h . h e ~ ~ /  4l / ~ / ! i&nd  
! 
qi~,b vl 1, ?A&r c 7 ~ ~  
I 
i 
"r. ^.C m n ,  t n r  rr,r,, lTCC 
Identifier 1 Phase of Case 
DC 015 COURT MINUTES 
0 2 4  
Page Tape IDDQLS Date I ~ / / L ; /  t(- case# @D-OS- 1 4 ~ i 3 1  
Identifier 1 Phase of Case 
I 
?_~.1i30 - 
DC 018 COURT 
I 
MINUTES 
STATE OF IDAHO case # CR dDD6-e /q+s/ 
P EARANCES: 
[ Defendant se [ ] Def. Attorn 
v FAILURE T O  APPEAR: Defendant having failed to appear, and no good cause shown 
for such absence, IT IS ORDERED: [ ] BOND FORFEITED [ ] BENCH WARRANT, BOND $ 
[ ] Right to speedy trial waived based on FTA [ ] Trial vacated [ ] Trial to remain as set' 
[ ] Refer to PA for fiirther action 
PROCEEDINGS Sr ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: TAPE # LOG# 
[ ] Defendant is informed of the charge(s) against himlher and all legal rights including the right to be 
represented by counsel. Defendant understands. 
[ 1 Defendant advised of effect of guilty plea and maximum penalties, also penalties for subsequent violations. 
Defendant understands. 
[ ] Matter Continued 
[ ] Charge amended 
[ ] Notify the Court, in writing of change in mailing address. 
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY HEARING 
[ ] Waived right to Counsel. SET [ I I4 DAYS [ 121 DAYS 
[ 1 Request Public Defender, sworn to Financial Statement. [ ] PH Waived 
[ ] Public Defender Appt'd. [ ] Reimburse $ /mo till the sum of $ has been paid. 
[ ] Public Defender Denied 
[ ] ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA: [ ] Set PTCIJury [ ] Set Court Trial 
BAIL: [ ] O.R. Release [ ] Released on previously posted bond [ I Bail set at $ 
NO CONTACT ORDER: [ ] NCO Entered [ ] NCO not ordered at this time 
[ ] ENTERS GUILTY PLEA freely and voluntarily with knowledge of consequences. [ ] Court accepts plea 
[ 1 Set for disposition . [ ] Defendant ordered to obtain an evaluation prior to sentencing: 
[ ] Alcohol [ ] Substance Abuse [ ] Batterer. [ ] Evaluation Waived. 
wEJ.,M J. DOUGLAS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 N. Government Way 
P.O. BOX 9000 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL, DIfjTNCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOQTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 CASE ~t). M05-1943 1 
Plaintiff. 1 I 
1 BNEE dl OPPOSI?IION OF 
VS. ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS j 
PEGGY JEAN FINN'ICW 1 
) I 
Defendant. 1 
C b f E S  NOW the State, by and through R Reese ~t&tt, Deputy PIosmting 
I 
Attorney, and hereby files its above entitled  fief, The oppoiition to defense motion is 
made upon the following grounds: 
! 
i 
ARGUMENT 1 
I 
In the matter befor'e this Court, Deputy McFarland re.$onded to 18363 Riverview 
Drive, Koobs i  County, State of Idaho, in order to bvestigate a possible domestic 
battery. Deputy MoFarland spoke with .the &fendantas son, +ur Finnic- who told 
Deputy McFar1a.d that the defendant Slad left in a white Chevkolet Blazer and that the 
I 
defendant had been drinking all day and that he believed she $as highly intoxioated. 
~ ~ ~ k ~ i m a t e l ~  30 minutes later,'Deputy ~ c ~ ~ l a u d  04served the defendant 
on a public roadway. Deputy McFml&d was flag$edl&wn and asked to stop in 
1 
the driveway of the residence. Once Deputy McFarland mad4 contact wi& the defendant, 
I 
he noted that: 1) she had a strong smell of an alcoholic beverabe on her breath; 2) her 
! 
speech was slurred; 3) +0 seemed confused; and 4) ha eyes &ere glassy and blood shot. 
The defendant was instructed to remain outside, but she ignorb that order and went into 
i 
the house. I 
Once Deputy Vzevich arrived on scene to assist with h e  invwtigaiion, the 
I 
deputies entered the house with the sole purpose of speaking $ith the defendant and 
I 
asking ha to come outside so they could wmplete the investikation. The defendant was 
! 
contacted inside her home and once she was questioned, she &reed to  come outside and 
I 
perform field sobnery tests. &r oompleting the investigatio)~, Deputy McFarland 
det&ed that she had driven mder the iduenoe and the defendant into custody. 
This case is similar to the facts presented in State v. ~uan~1er.i State v. Suangler, 130 
Idaho 944,950 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App. 1997). I 
- I 
In State v. Spancrler, the Court of Appeals of JdaZlo hdd that the police could enter 
onto a defendant's business premises and enter into that businbs once the police had 
I 
established a v&d reason to make a stop. &, 130 idah? at 946,950 P.2d at 1285. 
In Suan~~er, officers stopped and tried to contact the defendant &a they observed him 
swerve between two lanes of traffic and aRer making an a b 4 t  sharp left hLm intc the 
I 
driveway of his business. 130 Idaho at 944,950 P.2d at 1483. 
i 
The officers followed behind the defmdant &a he go? out of his car and asked 
him twioe to stop and talk to them. a While following b y  the def'endaat, the 
officers noted that they could smell an odor of alcohol coming! from the defendant. & 
I However, the defend& ignored their instructions to stop and bent into his business. Id. 
! 
' . BRLEE IN OPPOSrnON 0P:MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 2 
! 
The officers followed the d&bndant inside and ~ ~ c t e d ~  to comeback outside so 
m ,  
that they could complete their investigation. Id. 
! 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho reasoned that the intqkon was ''very limited" 
! 
because they were fo11owing someone who had ignored their fepeated instructions to stop 
! . . 
and speak with them. Quotar added, 130 Idaho at 945,940 P.2d at 1284. In addition, 
the Court of Appeals of idaho, citing State v. Manthei, held vt it would &feat the very 
purpose of Term to allow the defendant to ggo.into his businesg one he knew hewas being 
detained. and was not fie? to go. & 130 Idaho at 946,950 ~ , h d  at 3285; cittng&&3 
i 
Manthei, 1130 Idaho 237,939 P.2d 556 (1997). And, the CO& of ~ p p e d s  of ldaho found 
that this intrusion wasn't as invasive as the i&wio.n 3h MantFi bwause the officers 
limited the scope of the& intrusion to making contact with th4 defendant. Id, 
In the present matter, Deputy McFar1and and ~ e p u t y  ~revich went into the 
! 
defendant's home &a the defendant was instructed to r e m 4  outside for the sole 
purpose of contacting the defendant and asking her to eame bb outside so they wuld 
complete their investigation. Therefore, applying the ruljng b) Suan~lex, the intrusion 
! 
into the defendant's home was lawful and the evidence should not be suppressed. 
For the foregoing reasons, the.Defendaat's Motion should be denied. 
DATED this - B%~ of January 2006. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
EWfE IN OPPOSITION OF'MO~TON TO SUPPRESS - 3 
m .  
I here& eew that on the day of ' . t/w, 2006, a true and coned 
copy of the foregoing Brief was caused to be &edfmail$%:/ 
Frederick Cr. Loats ! 1 
Attorney at Law 
! P.O. Box 83 t 
j 
i 
/- 
I 
j 
i ! 
Case # J'JJ'3-- / 9 W /  
OM :FRED LORTS OFFICE -ciX NO. : 
FREDERICK G. LOA KT 
Aaorncy at LOW 
2005 Irr~nwoud .?arkway-SUII? 2 10 
P.0. Box 831 
Coeur d'Alcne, 10 83814 
Telephone: (208) 666%424 
Fm: (208)664-3644 
LSB No. 2147 
Attorney for Defendant 
N ?'HE IXSTRlC'I' COURT OP ?'HE FIRST .IUDICIAL DISTKICT OF THE 
STA'I'E OF I D M O ,  IN AND I70R 'ITS CQIJNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Plaintiff, 
j 
Case No. CR-2005-1943 1 
vs. 1 MOTION TO SET FUR 
1 nCSPO1YzTION 
PEGGY FINNICUM, 1 
Defendant. ) 
.- 3 
Defendant hereby moves the W r t  ,for an Order setting this matter for disposition far entry 
of a plea and sentencing at a later date and time, by and for the reasat] that counsel lbs Defendant 
is  unavailable for the Calendar Call set for 8:30 o'clock a.m. on Febwry 21, 2006, due to an 
Arraignment before Judge Verby s d  for 9:00 o'clock a.m. in Sandpoint, Tdaho, in &te v. Hatch, 
Bonner County Case No. CRFO6-402. 
DA'T'ED this 'fl_ date dFebnary, 2006. P 
L. 
mEDE'RICK G. LOATS ' 
Attorney for Defendant 
OM :FRED LORTS OFFlCE 
CERTIFJCATI3 OF MAILING 
1 hereby certi'j that on this day of Februaty ,2006, a true and conect copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the Kootenai County P~osccuting Attorney by fascimile trmmission 
to 446-1833. 
.-~.Lq .,*. .--. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION TO SET FOR 
DISPOSITION -2 
,dg& Case # CP @ n ~ s  - /91/ a,/ 
I 
For 
I I 
For 
For 
2 
n 
/ Date @$ IOW Time a pni/ Cou troom #& 
Tape# b1L-lg9 Judge ~ , ~ ~ d ~ d d (  
Court Reporter a 
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : u l .  10 2006 10:39RM P 1  
FREDERICE G. LOATS 
Attorney at Law 
11 1 North 2nd Street 
P. 0. 8o.x 831 
Coeur d'Alem, ID 83814 
Telephone (208)667-6424 
Fizu: (208)664-3644 
. ISR Nr,. 2147 
Atturney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTONAl 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
1 
1 Case No. CR-2005-001943 1 
\ 
VS. i MDTlON TO CONTWUE 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 1 
1 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing the hearing set for July /32006 
by and for the reason that counsel for defendant is unavailable due to a felony jury trial set in 
Shoshone County before Judge abler, entitled State v. Faith, Shoshone County Case No. 2006- 
Dated this&day of July, 2006 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION TO CONTZNUE. Wge 1 
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : ul. 10 2006 10: 39RM P2 
CERT@ICATf? OF SERVICE 
I hershy certify that a true copy ofthc foregoing was served upon counsel for the State by 
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County F'rosecuting Attorney, at 446-1 833, t h i s u d a y  of July, 
2006. 
I #LUR 4. 
FREDERICK G. UlATS 
Attomoy for Defeddant 
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : 
FREDERICK a. LOATS 
Attorney at Law 
2005 hnwood Parkway, Suite 210 
P. 0. Box 83 1 
Coeur dglene, ID 83816-01331 
Telephone: (208)6G7-6424 
Fa: (208)664-3644 
IS61 No. 2147 
Attorney for Defendant 
TN THE; DTSTRICT COURT OF THE FRST JUDICIAL DLSTRTCT OF TKF: 
S'FATE OF IDAHO, LN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-M05- 19431 
1 
VS. ) ORDER TO CONTINWE 
PEGGY JEAN EINNICUM, 
Defendant. ) 
Based up011 tile Motion filed herein, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Sentel~cing Hearing presently scheduled for the 13" 
day of July, 2006 at 
by the Clerk of tho Cou 
DATED this 
O M  TO CONTINUE- Page 1 
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : d l .  10 2006 10:40RM P4 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 08 SERMCE 
I hereby certify that on 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was sent to: 
Frederick G. hats, Attorney at Law, by fax 664-3644 
Kootcnai County Prosecuting Attorney, by fax L/#b -/f3 3 
CLERK OF COURT 
ORDER TO CONTINU&- Page 2 
Case # 
&A&- ~ate7-;? l d&~ ime  4 1 Courtroom #& 
I u u  ,j 
Tape # (Q 1 @ d Judge p1/!9/7// R~ I& J 
Court Reporter 
T ~ p e  of ~roceedindb I o ~ A ,  2 L# ~f i /~~~id f r -  
For 
Identifier Phase of Case 
I 
Counsel Partv /
For I 1 
For 
Plaintiff 
I(C- 
L 
Defendant 
, I 
DC 015 COURT MINUTES 
Identifier Phase of Case 
I 
FREDERZCK G. LOATS 
Attorney at Law 
2005 Ironwood Parkway-Suite 210 
P. 0. Box 831 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone (208j667-6424 
FOX: (208)664-3644 
ISB No. 2347 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2005-001943 1 
VS. 
) 
1 CONDZTZONAL PLEA OF 
) GUZL TY 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 1 
1 
Defendant. ) 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1 l(a)(2), I.C.R., defendant hereby enters a conditional 
plea of guilty in the above entitled action, reserving the right to appeal from the judgment and the 
denial of the Motion to Suppress. 
. " 
Dated t h i s 2 3  day of ,2006. 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 1 
Attorney for Defendant 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF 
GUILTY I 
No Objection to entry of Conditional Plea: 
4 L~ 
Depu Prosecutdng Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the - day of February, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was sewed upon the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney by fax to 446-1 833. 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF 
GLTLTY 2 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney at Law 
2005 Ironwood Parkway-Suite 210 
P. 0. Box 831 
Coeur dlcllene, ID 83814 
Telephone (208jbd-i-6424 
Far: (208)664-3644 
ISB No. 2147 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TfE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2005-001943 1 
j 
vs. ) ORDER APPROYING AND 
) ACCEPTING CONDITIONAL 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 1 PLEA OF GUILTY 
j 
Defendant. 1 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1 l(a)(2), I.C.R., the Prosecuting Attorney having 
consented to entry of a conditional plea, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the conditional plea of guilty entered by the defendant in 
the above entitled action, resewing the right to appeal from the judgment, to review the denial of 
is accepted and approved. 
2006. 
ORDER ACCEPTING 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h a L  day o % , 2006 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney by inter-office mailifax to 
446-1833, and to Frederick G. Loats, attorney for defendant 
ORDER ACCEPTING 
COO\'31TIO\rW. PLEA Qf SLTILTY 2 
JUDICIAL Dm CT COURT. STATEOF IDAHO. C O W  ' OF KOOTENAI 
324 W. GARDEN A" I ,  P.O. BOX 9M)O, COEUR D'ALEME, . I 0  Wl69000 
a A T E  OF IDAHO V 
mGGY.JEuvmCUM 
l a 3 6 3 W R r m x v E w a D  
POST 854 
SSN DL#
Doa AC;ENCY: K O O r n A I  COUNTY SHWIFlF 
CASE # CR-a05-0019431 CITATION # 94468 
The defendant avtng been fully advised of hislher statutory and constitutionai rights including the right to be represented by counsei, and 
d e e n  advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent 
Defendant waived right to counsel • Judgment--Not Guilty 
dant represented by counsel • Judgment o n  Trial--Guilty 
&men!, Plea i f  Guilty I Rights Waived Judgment for Defendant I Infraction 
Withheld Judgment Accepted • Judgment for State 1 Infraction 
q Dismissed • Bond Forfeited I Conviction Entered - Case Closed 
C] Bond Forfeited I Dismissed 
M O N I E S O I $ E D  PAID: A $2.00 handling fee 
~ n e  I Penalty $ 7 . ddi7 . OF7 Costs mbation Fee $70.00 Suspended $ 1- ba3. US) 
O P a y  by , or enroll in time payment program BEFO* due date. 
Community Senrice hours by Setup Fee $ Insurance Fee $ 
k%%E:nerated, provoed tha~ any depori shall l~rst be appl~ed pursuant to Idaho Code 19.2923 m satofactan of oulslandrg fnes fees 
ana costs wth any remainder lo be refunoed lo the postlnq parry 
N o  Contact order,  as condition of bond, terminated. 
days, Credit days 
- 0 
&:;leas Authorized (if you qualify) q In-Home Monitoring 
6 f f ' s  Community Labor Program in lieu of Jail (if you qualify) 90 hours by 16/31 /'6 Must sign up within 7 days. 
DRIVING PRIVILEGESSUSPENDED 3~s"dayscommencing /fl - "L of~ / /7  - 
REINSTATEMENT OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES MUST BE ACCOM n drive. Apply to DRIVER'S~ERVICES, P.O. 00x7129, 
Boise, ID. 83707-1 129. 
Temporary Driving Privileges Granted commencing 
To, from and for work purposes1 required medical care /court ordered alcohol program /community service. Must cany p r w f  of w o k  
schedule and liability insurance at all times. Not valid if insurance expires. 
PROBATION ORDERED FOR YEAR(S) ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: @S$ervised - See Addendum 
C] Violate no federal, state or local iaws more serious than an infraction. CiComrnit no similar offenses. 
Ci Maintain liability insurance on any vehicie that you drive. 
Do not operate a motor vehicle with any alcohol in your bloodstream. 
Ci You must submit to any blood alcohol concentration test requested of you, with reasonable cause, by a peace officer. 
q Obtain a Substance AbuselBattery Evaluation, and file proof of evaluation, within days. 
q Enroll in program, and file proof, within days. File proof of completion within days. 
jXI Notify the court, in writing, of any address change within 10 days. Agrees to accept future service by mail at the last known address. 
q interlock ignition device required on vehicle for year(s). To be installed per attached addendum. 
q Other 
THEDEFENDANTHASTHERIGHTTO APPEAL 
THISJUDGMENT WITHIN42 DAYS 
. . "  ... 
F I R S  J D I C I A L  DISTRICT,  S T A T E  C. A H 0  
C O U N T Y  O F  K O O T E N A I  
S U P E R V I S E D  P R O B A T I O N  O R D E R  
. , . - , r i i  , . .-,. :: . ~ r .  ?. ;!;j.(,S@ , 
( A d d e n d u m )  .~,.. >:,)~!?;8 @ ~;Q,;~f~,;;,,! ;$is 
i-11 up. ;~-J/-oG 
"-L-_*. -.--: :...---.- ---- 
STATE OF IDAHO V. 
CASE #: 
IT  IS FURTHER ORDERED: 
~ n s c h e d u l e d  Jail Time (UJT), in the amount of 3 days are ordered, to be scheduled at a 
time and date requested by the Probation Office and approved by the Court. 
DEFENDANT SHALL REPORT to the Kootenai County Adult Misdemeanor Probation Office @ 106 E. Dalton Ave. 
(PO Box 9000) Coeur dlAlene, Id. 83816-9000, (446-1985), WITHIN THREE (3) BUSINESS DAYS of today's date, in 
reference to this order. The following is also ordered: 
THE DEFENDANT SHALL: . ~ 
. . 
Fully cooperate, comply and be courteous with the Probation Office; be completely honest and forthright, and follow 
any and all reasonable terms and conditions that the probation office may impose, including but not limited to: 
-Pay probation supervision fees as allowed by statute and set by Probation Office, not to exceed $35.00 per month. 
-Not evade supervision, and notify the probation office immediately of any change of address. 
-Notify the Probation Office within 24 hours of any law enforcement contact. 
-Maintain verifiable, sustained and gainful employment, or participate in a vocational/educational program aimed at 
enhancing personallcommunity adjustment. A search for employment, if applicable, will be sought in full earnest. 
-Submit readily to  searches of hislher person, personal effects, vehicle, residence andlor any accessible property 
without a warrant, pursuant to probation supervision, at the request of the Probation Office or Law Enforcement. 
-Abstain from using any alcohotic beverages. 
-Not use or possess any illegal drug, not abuse any drug, and readily submit to testing for the presence of drugs or 
alcohol, as requested by the Probation Office or Law Enforcement. Test samples shall not be altered in any way. 
-Not be present in  an establishment where the primary business is the sale of alcohol (except for valid employment 
purposes) andlor other places prohibited by the Probation Office. 
-Not associate with other persons on probationlparoie or those who engage in unlawful activity. 
-Not violate any federal, state or local laws, greater than a traffic infraction. 
Additional/ the defendant shall complete a certified/approved: 
&Alcohol Evaluation; 0-DUI Evaluation; 0-Domestic Violence Evaluation; 0-Mental Health Evaluation; 
0-Sexual Offender Evaluation; 0-Other Evaluation 
and satisfactorily participate in  and complete the recommended and approved treatment in a manner and schedule 
-
set by the Probation Office. 
0-Not  threaten, assault, intimidate, harass, or otherwise bother any victims or witnesses associated with this 
matter and 0-not  initiate any contact directly or indirectly with any such party until further order of court or probation. 
I, THE DEFENDANT, UNDERSTAND THAT ALL SUSPENDED PENALTIES (JAIUFINES), ARE SUBJECT TO COMPLIANCE WITH 
ALL PROBATION TERMS, AND DO COMPLETELY ACCEPTTHE TERMS OFTHIS ORDER AND PROBATION. 
Signed: 
i DATED 
I 
.,:-..:h,.+:..... P,,,,., ,*,L,.7"3,. 
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : 
FREDERICK G LOATS 
Altorni?y ut Law 
2005 Ironwood Parkwuy-SU~~L-. 2113 
P. 0. Box 831 
Coeur d'.4[ene, ID 83814 
Telephone (208)667-6424 
bbr: (208)664-3644 
ISB No. 2/47 
2006 JUL 24 AN 10: 18 
Attorney for DdendantAppellant 
IN 'I'ilE DlSTRICT COURT OF 'RlE FIRST JUDICIAL MS'YNCT OF THE 
STATE OF rnhli0, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENA T 
STAV, OF DAHO, ) 
1 
Plaintiff-Respoodcnt, ) Cwe No. CR-2005-00 1943 1 
I 
VS. ) MOK?UN FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
) OF THESENTENCE PENDING APPEAL. 
PEGGY JEAN r n C U M ,  
1 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
-- - ,2 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54.5(b)(7), ICR, Defendant-Appellant hereby moves the 
Court for an Order staying execution of the Judgment and Sentence imposed herein pending the 
outcome of the appeal, and that such stay be ordered without the requirement that the Defendaut- 
Appellant post bail, by and for the reason that the Defcnht-Appellant i s  a long term resident of 
Kootenai County, rnanied, employed, has appeared for all Court proceedings and is no fl igM risk. 
Alternatively, the Defendant-Appellant requests that, pursuant to the provisions of Idaho 
Code Section 19-3941, that the Court set bail in the amount of $1,000.00, which is the amount of 
the fine and costs imposed in the Court's Judgment, which bail may he pstcrd in csh, and that rt 
MOTTON FOR STAY OTEXECUTION 
0,FSENTENCIsPENnING APPEAL - P a i y ~  I
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : 
stay of execution thereafter occur as mandatcd by ICR 5 4 . 3 4  
Dated thisadaY of July, 2006. 
Attorney for Defendant 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel for the State by 
FAX to the offlee of? the Kootonai County Prosecuting Attorney, at 446- 1833, this a day of July, 
2006. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION FOR STAY OFEX3JCUTlON 
OFSENTENCEPENnINGAPPE4L - Poge 2 
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : .l. 24 2006 E P 3 : l l f I M  P1 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CMIMIY OF KOC~TEMJ }SS 
FILED 
FREDERICK 0, LOA TS 
Attorney a1 Luw 
200.5 Ironwood Parkway-Suite 2IO 
P. 0. Box 831 
Coew d'Alene, IL) 83814 
Telephone (2013)667-($424 
Fm: (208)664-3644 
1SB Mo. 2147 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
PI THE DlSlWCT COURT OF THE EILRST ,lUDTClAL DISTRICT OF l%l3 
STATE OF IDMO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTm\lAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Plaintiff-Respond&, ) Case No. CR-2005-001943 1 
1. 
vs . 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
PECGY JEAN FINNlCLM, ) 
1 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
.."-"- --.. . 1 
%Fendant hereby appeal from #at Judgment wtered in the above entitled action on the 2 1" 
day of July, 2006, the Honorable Penny E. Friedlandcr, Magistrate Judge, presiding. Thr: appeal is 
tsken upon both matters aflaw and fact. The testimony in the original hearing and proceedings 
were recorded and are in tho posscssion of tho Clerk ofthe Court. The issue that will be asserted 
on appeal is that the Ahgistr~te erred in denying the Motion to Suppress 
Dated thisaday of July, 2006. 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Attorney for Defendant 
FROM :FRED LOOTS OFFICE FRX NO. : 
J hereby certifjr that a true copy ofthe foregoing was sewed upon counset tbr the State by 
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attomey, at 446- 1833, thisay day of July, 
2006. 
M.-L. kf 
FREDERICK G. IXIA'm 
Attorney for &fendant 
N0.TfCE 0FAI'PE.M - Page 2 
FRO@ :FRED LOATS OFFICE FQX NO. : 
FREDERICK G. LOA ATS 
Attorney ai Luw 
2005 frc~rnond Parkway-Suite 210 
P. 0. Brm 83 I 
Coe14r i i ' ~ ~ ~ n e ,  83814 
Telephone (208)667-6424 
F a :  (20R/664-3644 
IS8  No. 2147 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
IN THE IXSTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JXJD1CIA.l. DlSTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IT)AHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF TDAFJ.0, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Case No, CR-2005-001943 1 
1 
VS. 1 ORDER STAYIN( EXECUTTON 
) OF TI&!? S&"T%NCE PENDING APPEAL 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 1 
1 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
-..- -- 
Based upon the Appeal and Motion for Stay filed herein by the Defendant-Appellant, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thax execution ofthe Judgment and Sentence imposed herein 
shalt be stayed pending the outcome ofthe appeal. 
ORDER ST4 W G  EWCt/TfON 
OF SENl!ENCIE PENnING APPEAL -Page 1 
FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : 
CFBmCATE OF SERVICE 
T hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was sewed upon counsel forthe State by 
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Anorncy, at 446-1833, 
Defendant-Appellant by FAX to Frederick G. Loats* at 6 w 4 4 ,  thisAk 
ORDER STA YlNG EXECUTION 
OF.~NTZ3CEPliNDXNGAPPEAl. -Page 2 
Oi l  : FRFD LOFTS OFF 1 CE 
FREDERICK G LOA TS 
Attorney at Luw 
1 I 1  North 2nd Street 
P. 0. Box 83 1 
Coeur d512ene, ID 83814 
?'ekephone (208)667-6424 
Fax: (208)664-3644 
ISA No. 2 147 
2806 SEP 25 RH 10: 57 
,--', 
Attorney for Uefendant-Appellant 
IN TI% DISTRICT COTJRT OF T.kE FIRST .TUDICTAL DISTRICT OF TEE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEN'N 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Case No. CR-2005-0019431 
) 
VS. ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1 
PEGGY .WAN FR\TNICUM, 1 
) 
Defendant-Appellmt. ) 
.- ." - d
Statement of the Case 
This is an appeal taben a k r  sentry of a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of driving 
while under the influence ofalcohol, after denial of the Defendant- appellant"^ Motion to Suppress. 
After being charged with driving while under the influence, the Appellant filed ahlotjon (:o 
Suppress, contending that certain material evidence was ucquired by the police in violation cuf her 
constitutional right to be $?ee from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically the Appellant 
contended that the police had unlawfully entered her home to seize her during the course oftheir 
investigation. 
'RX NO. : 
An evidontiary hearing was held on the Motion to Suppress on December 15,2005. The 
Court took the matter under advisement, nnd later enter& its decision denying the Motion to 
Suppress. The Appellant then filed aMotion for reconsideration, which was denied a k r  argument. 
J&sues Presented on Api~eaf 
I .  Did the Court err in ruling that the police may InwFully invade a home to effect a Teny 
style detention? 
2. Did the Court e n  in finding and then ruling that tho police had prohable cause to arrest 
the Appellant for driving while under the influence of alcohol, and then could constitutiondly enter 
her home to arrest her under the exigent circumstances exception io the warrant requirement? 
Statement of the Baets 
At the Suppression Hearing, the parties stipulated that the matter be submitted on the facts 
set forth in the arresting offroer's report, admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit #I .  Tr, p. 3, L 15-24. 
The pertinent part of the report states US 'Follows: 
"On 09/25/05 at approx. 1756 hours I along with (M) Dep. Vrevich were dispatched to 
respond to a possible do&esljc dispute at 18363 W. Riverview Dr. While enroute to the call 
Dispatch notifled us that the female halfhad left the scene driving a white Chevy Blwer and was 
possibly intoxicated. Dep. Vrevich was checkingthc. area and also advised Post Falls of a possible 
intoxicated driver. I am'ved on scene at approx. 181 0 hours were (sic) 1 met Arthur M. Finnicum. 
Archur and his girlfriend were waiting at the top of his driveway on Riverview Rd. To speak with 
me reference the possible domestic dispute. 
Arthur said that he and his mother, (S) Peggy J. Finnicum got into a verbal argument carlier 
that evening because Arthur believed &at she needed to stop drinking. Athur said Peggy got upset 
and said 'Fuck you!" repeatedly. Arthur said he did not know what to do so he called his father for 
advice. Arthur said his father told him to call the police. Arthur said when he called the police 
Peggy 1eA the house driving hcr white Chevy Blazer. Arthur said that Peggy had been drinking 
alcoholic beverages all day and he believed that she was highly intoxicated. 
While I was speaking to Arthur at approx. 1 82 1 hours, I saw Peggy drive up in her white 
Chevy Blazer tmve1in.g eastbound on Riverview Dr. 1 flagged Peggy down and told her to pull into 
the driveway so I could speak to her. While I was speaking to her I could smell the strong odor of 
an alcob,oiic beverage on her breath. :I advised her to drive down the driveway in a safe area so I 
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could do some further investigation. Peggy was slurring her speech, had glassy and blood shot eyes, 
and seemed confused. 
1 asked Peggy to step out of the vehicle. Peggy stepped out of the vehicle. I told Peggy to 
stay by her car so J could speak to Arthur. Peggy continued t said, 'What are you doing here' 1 
advised Peggy that 1 was here to investigate a domestic disturbance between her and hcr son Arthur. 
1 trtso advised Peggy that she appeared to be intoxicated and she was driving her vehicle on a public 
roadway. 
Wh11e I was speaking to Afihur,  peg^ went Jnto the house. Dep Vrevich arrived on scenc 
to assist me m my investigation. 1 advised Dep. Vrevich thct Pagby went into the house when she 
was told lo stay outside. Dep Vrevich and I enlered the house through the .front door to reestablish 
contact with Peggy." 
Deputy Vrevich supplemented the report with his &stimony. He said that when he arrived 
Peggy Finnicum was outside her house, sitting on a bench. He was talking with the other Deputy 
when Peggy Finnicum got up and walked inside her home. He foliowe& without pemission or 
consent. Tr., pp. 7-8. J3e testified he did so because he was concerned she may have access to 
weapons inside the home. Tr., p. 8, L 18-19. 
Peggy was "upset" that the Deputy entored her home. Tr., p. 9, L 2-3. I-fe rclnained inside 
the home with her, and then he and the other Deputy took her outside, where she was asked and 
performed fidd sobriety evaluations. After these evaluations were completed, she was wrested for 
driving while under the ifiuence. Pursuant to Idaho's Implied Consent Law, she submitted to 
evidentitrry tosting which showed an alcohol concentration in excess of .20, and she was therefore 
charged with '%xcessive"DUI 
Argument 
A. The officer's entty into the Appellant's home to complete or continue their Terry 
(Mention was unconstitntictnal: 
In State v. Manthei, 230 Idaho 237,240 (1 997). the Cow held that once a Terry style stop 
is initiated, The police may lawfully enter a subject" home to takc the individual into physical 
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custody, See, also, State v. Hinson, 132 Idaho 110 (1.998). 
In State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817 (2004)- the Court ovemled State v. Manthei and State 
v. Hinson. "This Court holds that th.e police naynot make a warrantless, nc>nconsensual entry into 
a residence in order ~o effectuate a 1 P r y  stop.. . ." State V. Maland, 140 Idaho 8 17, 8 18 (2004). 
"Manthei waq wrongly decided and must be overruled. Manthei has led to the cnoneous 
argument that taw enforcement officers may enter u home to effectuate a 'hny stop when there is 
no probable cause for an arxest, nor exigent circumstances including but not limited to, officer OT 
other's safety. [Citations omitted]. For the same reasons, State v. Rinson, 132 Idaho 1 10,967 P.2d 
724 (1,998) was also wrongly decided and must be overruled." Statev. Maland, 140 Idaho 817,823 
(2004). 
The Court distinguished Malaad by ruling that the stop in Matand ~ a c  not initiated outside 
the residence, but only after entry into the residence. However, this overlooks the precise language 
quoted above, in which the Court overmfcd Manthei and Hinson. This element of the Maland 
decision has been addressed by the Court of Appcals. 
"In Maethei, the Court had held that an officer may follow a person into his home where 
the officer la~fblly initiates an investigative Teny stop bwed upon reasonable suspicion and that 
person retreats into his home. [Citation oomitted]. Wanthei lias led to the erroneous argument that 
law enfmcemenl officers may enter a home to effectuate a Terry stop when there is  no probable 
cause for an arrest, nor exigent circumstances including but not limited to officer or other's safety.' 
[Citation omitteq. 'l'hus, despite the fact that the Court in Maland found the officer's failure to 
show authority prior to h4aiand's attempt to cl.osc the door to be significant, the Court overruled 
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Manthei and coi~cluded that initiation of a Tern1 stop in a public place does not allow the oficer 
to follow if the individual pursued retreats into his home." State v. Jenkins, I d a h o  -- (Ct. 
App., March 1.0,2006), 2006 op. no. 17. 
The Maland and Jenkins decisions are binding precedent and establish that the entry that 
occurred in this case was uncon,stitutinnal, under a Terry stop justification. In addition, no exigent 
circumstances were present that justified entry into the home. D g .  Vrevich gave his reasons for 
entry as a concern for weapons. The call the police responded to was a verbal argument between 
mother and son. There was no indication of my acts ofviolence or weapons present. The fact that 
the police labeled thc call under the rubtic of "domestic disturbance" does not automatically give 
them carte blanohe to ignore the constitutinn and invade the sanctity ofthe home. 
B. There was no arrest prior to entry into the borne: 
' h e  Appellantwas not arrested before she entered her home. She was not told she was under 
arrest, nor was she subjected to thnt type ofphysical restraint n.onnally associated with an arrest. 
Neither of the officers entered hcr home to place her under arrest. In fact, after they removed her 
From her home they had her do field sobriety evaluatiom, questioned her, and conducted a '%)UPy 
investigxtion. It was only after this investigation was comp'lete that they concluded probb1e cause 
existed to place her under arrest. To find, after the fact, that the police had probable cause to arrest 
her for DkJl prior to entry into her home, and therefore exigent circumstances existed to justiQ the 
warrantless entry into her home, i s  to .re-find thc fwts to fit a result and do a disservice to the 
constitutional protections provided to an individual's home. The distinction between "probable 
cause to asrest" and "reauonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is 
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occumhg$:" [the Trrry standard], i s  impossible to define with precision. See, Ornclar V. United 
States, 5 17 U.S. 690 (1996). It is therefore better practice to apply the appropriate legal standards 
basedupon the reality of police action. The police did notarrestPeggyPinnicum before she entered 
her home. They did not tell her she was under arrest when they entered her home. They did not tell 
her she w a s  under arrest when they removed her from her home and had her pirform field sobri&y 
evaluations. If they had done so, then thcy should have also advised her of her constjtutional rights 
under Mtranda v. Arizona. 
Since the police did not arrest her prior to their entry, thcre is no need to annlyze the case 
from tlmt perspective. The Mland decision is therefore controlling, and the Mbtion to Suppress 
should have been. granranted. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requestedthat the .ludgment be set aside and the 
case remanded with instructions to grant the Appellant's Motion to Suppress. 
/ Dated this%$ -day of September, 2006. 
Attorney for Defendant 
1 hereby certify that a hue copy of thc foregoing was served upon counsel for the State by 
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, at 446-1833, this23 day of 
September, 2006. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Slightly before 6:00 p.m. on September 25,2005, Kootenai County Deputies Vrevich and 
McFarland were dispatched to a possible domestic dispute at a residential address. Transcript, 
Motion to Suppress and Oral Decision, at 27. While on route, Dispatch advised that the "female 
half' of the dispute had left the scene in a white Chevy Blazer and was possibly intoxicated. Tr. 
at 28. As the first to arrive on scene, Deputy McFarland made contact with the reporting party, 
the Defendant's son, Arthur Finnicum. Tr. at 28. Mr. Finnicum informed Deputy McFarland 
that he and his mother had gotten into a verbal argument over her drinking and that she had 
driven away in her white Chevy Blazer when he had called the police. Tr. at 28. According to 
Mr. Finnicum, his mother had been drinking alcoholic beverages all day, and he believed her to 
be higbly intoxicated. Tr. at 28. 
While speaking to Mr. Finnicum, Deputy McFarland saw the Defendant driving the white 
Chevy Blazer back to the residence. Tr. at 28. He flagged the Defendant down and told her to 
pull into the driveway so he could speak with her. Tr. at 28-29. Defendant complied. While 
speaking with her, Deputy McFarland observed the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on her 
breath, glassy and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and that she seemed confused. Tr. at 29. He 
then had the Defendant drive down the driveway to a safe place in order to do some further 
investigation. At that location, Deputy McFarland asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle, 
which she did. Tr. at 29. He also told her to stay by the car so he could speak fiuther with her 
son. Tr. at 29. He informed Defendant that he was there to investigate a domestic dispute 
between her and her son and that she appeared to be driving her vehicle on a public roadway 
while intoxicated. Tr. at 29. 
Deputy Vrevich arrived as a cover unit while Deputy McFarland was speaking with Mr. 
Finnicum for the second time. Tr. at 28. While Deputy Vrevich spoke with Deputy McFarland, 
he noticed the Defendant walking into the house. Tr. at 29. She appeared to him to either be 
intoxicated, or have a physical impairment, because she was not walking in a straight line. Tr. 
29-30. AAer Deputy McFarland told Deputy Vrevich both that the Defendant had driven right by 
him on a public road and exhibited a blank stare, as if she did not see him, and that he had 
previously told the Defendant to stay outside, Deputy Vrevich followed the Defendant into the 
house to reestablish contact with her. Tr. at 29-30. He was specifically concerned about the 
possibility of weapons, due to the call being reported as a "domestic", and he wanted to keep an 
eye on the Defendant. Tr. at 30. 
Once inside the house, Deputy Vrevich observed that Defendant had glossy eyes, an odor 
of alcohol, slurred speech, and trouble speaking. Tr. at 30. Deputy McFarland asked Defendant 
to complete field sobriety tests in her driveway, and she was ultimately arrested. Tr. at 30. Afler 
submitting a breath sample with a breath alcohol content of .26/.25, Defendant was charged with 
Excessive Driving Under the Influence. Tr. 30. 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence on the grounds that police entry into her home 
was unlawful. Tr. at 1. The trial court denied Defendant's motion on the grounds that a 
stop had been effectuated outside of the residence when Defendant complied with police orders 
to pull forward in the driveway and step out of the vehicle. Tr. at 32. Thus, the police entry into 
Defendant's residence was not unlawful, according to State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 
430 (2004), and prior authority. Tr. at 33. Defendant now appeals the trial court's ruling. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether or Not Police Lawfully Pursued the Defendant into Her Residence After She Had 
Been Lawfully Ordered to Remain Outside the Home. 
STANDARD O F  REVIEW 
"Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a trial 
de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine the appeal as an 
appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal from the 
district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules 
of the Supreme Court." I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l). When reviewing a trial court's order denying or 
granting a motion to suppress, the appellate court is to accept the trial court's factual findings, 
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84,90 P.3d 306,309 (2004). The 
appellate court exercises free review, however, over the question of whether or not those facts 
require suppression of the evidence. Id. The appellate court is fiee also to affirm the trial court's 
decision on a legal basis other than that relied upon by the trial court. S e e s .  State v. Murray, 
Ct. App., decided November 30,2006, WL 3438037 * l .  
ARGUMENT 
The Magistrate Court's Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Should be Affirmed 
Because, at the Time of Entry into Defendant's Residence, the Officers Were Faced With 
Exigent Circumstances and had Probable Cause to Arrest Defendant and/or Search Her 
House. 
A. The Potential Destruction of Evidence Presented by Defendant's Flight into 
the Residence Qualifies as Exigent Circumstances, Because Driving Under 
the Influence is Not a "Relatively Minor" Crime and the Evidence at Issue Is 
Evanescent in Nature. 
Police officers may enter a home without a warrant if probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are present. State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993) (citing 
Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1983)). Exigencies which justify a warrantless entry of a 
home include potential destruction of evidence, so long as the offense related to the evidence is 
not "relatively minor." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.740 (1984); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 
88,90 P.3d 306, 313 (2004); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho at 226, 869 P.2d at 226. Whether or not an 
offense is "relatively minor" depends on the nature of the penalty for the offense. Fees, 140 
Idaho at 88,90 P.3d at 313 (overruling in part State v. Curl, where Curl held that the analysis 
depended on whether the offense involved was violent or nonviolent.) See also Illinois v. 
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). This is because, "[gliven that the classification of state crimes 
differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to 
provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals 
suspected of committing that offense." Fees, 140 Idaho at 88,90 P.3d at 313 (quoting McArthur, 
at 336 (quoting m, at 754)). 
1. Driving Under the Influence is Not a "Relatively Minor" Offense. 
No Idaho case law has addressed the question of whether or not driving under the 
influence is a "relatively minor" offense for purposes of applying the exigent circumstances 
doctrine. However, under Idaho's statutory scheme, first offense driving under the influence is 
categorized as a misdemeanor criminal offense, punishable by up to six months of jail and a 
$1,000 fine, or both. I.C. 5 18-8005(a) and (b) (2006). In addition, an individual convicted of 
driving under the influence, even for the first time, could suffer an absolute driver's license 
suspension for a period of up to six months. I.C. 5 18-8005(d) (2006). These penalties increase 
with subsequent convictions, with a third conviction in ten years constituting a felony. See LC. 5 
18-8005(5) (2006). Consequently, an individual convicted of driving under the influence faces 
significant curtails of his or her freedom that one does not face if convicted of an infraction or 
other misdemeanor. By authorizing such a penalty scheme for driving under the influence, the 
Idaho State Legislature has established that driving under the influence is not a "relatively 
minor" offense. 
Such conclusion is supported by a thorough examination of Welsh v. Wisconsin. In 
w h ,  a witness observed a car that was being driven erratically, eventually swerving off the 
road and coming to a stop in a field without causing damage to any person or property. &!&&, at 
742. The driver walked away from the scene despite advice from the witness that he wait for 
assistance in removing the car. Id. When police arrived a few minutes later, they were told by 
the witness that the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. a. After tracing the car's 
registration back to the defendant's address, the police entered the home.' a. They found the 
defendant lying naked in bed, and he was subsequently arrested for driving while under the 
influence of an intoxicant. m h ,  at 743. 
The defendant challenged his arrest as the result of an unlawful, warrantless entry into his 
home. m h ,  at 747. Inter alia, the State argued that need to preserve evidence of the 
defendant's blood-alcohol level constituted an exigent circumstance which, when coupled with 
'The police entered after the defendant's stepdaughter answered the door. However, because the 
trial court did not make a finding as to whether the entry was consensual, the Court assumed that 
there was no valid consent to enter the defendant's home for purposes of its decision. See 
probable cause for the defendant's arrest, allowed the warrantless entry. @. at 753. Such 
argument was rejected by the Court, because the State of Wisconsin had chosen to classify a first 
offense of driving while intoxicated as a "noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense," for which no 
imprisonment was authorized. Id. at 746 (citing Wis.Stat. 4 346.65(2) (1975)). Thus, it was 
significant that the maximum penalty authorized for such an offense was a mere $200 fine and no 
jail. See Id. 
is clearly distinguishable Erom the present case, and other state courts have 
similarly limited Welsh's application to nonjailable offenses. For example, in People v. 
Thompson, 135 P.3d 3, 38 Cal.4"' 81 1 (2006), the California Supreme Court addressed the very 
issue before this Court and held that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry to effect 
a driving under the influence arrest, because California classifies driving under the influence as a 
criminal act punishable by no more than six months and no less than 96 hours in jail. Thompson, 
135 P.3d at 9, 38 Cal.4' at 821. In fact, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals (applying 
Massachusetts law) have all distinguished Welsh on similar grounds. Thom~son, 135 P.3d 
at 10-1 1,38 ~aI.4 '  at 822-23. Even Wisconsin has since distinguished m, where the 
distinguishing court was faced with a misdemeanor offense punishable by up to six months in 
jail, rather than the nonjailable offense present in Welsh. Id., 135 P.3d at 10, 38 Cal.4"' at 823 
(citing State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 233 Wis.2d 280 (2000)). 
Here, the Idaho State Legislature has clearly indicated that it considers driving under the 
influence a more serious crime than did the Wisconsin State Legislature at the time Y&l& was 
decided. It has done so not only by authorizing serious penalties for those who drive while under 
the influence, which penalties entitle a defendant to a jury trial and court-appointed attorney if 
defendant is indigent, but also by treating driving under the influence as a felony for the purpose 
of arrest. See I.C. § 49-1405 (2006); State v. Ruhter, 107 Idaho 282,283,688 P.2d 1187, 1188 
(1984). The Legislature has further indicated it considers driving under the influence a serious 
crime by enacting law requiring individuals reasonably suspected of driving under the influence 
to submit to evidentiary testing of their breath or blood upon request of a police officer. See I.C. 
§ 18-8002(1) (2006). It is therefore appropriate that driving under the influence be deemed by 
Idaho courts as not a "relatively minor" offense for purposes of applying exigent circumstances 
doctrine. 
2. The Potential Destruction of Evanescent Evidence Clearly Qualifies as 
Exigent Circumstances. 
Idaho has already recognized that the potential loss or destruction of evanescent evidence 
such as the concentration of alcohol in one's blood or breath qualifies as exigent circumstances. 
See State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697,701,39 P.3d 637,641 (Ct. App. 2001). This is due to the 
-
fact that "blood alcohol concentration begins to dissipate due to the body's natural metabolism of 
alcohol shortly after a person stops drinking." Id. Consequently, police officers in Idaho are 
empowered to order medical personnel to withdraw a blood sample for evidentiary testing. 
LC. 5 18-8002(6)(b) (2006); See also Cooper, at 696,39 P.3d at 636. Moreover, all drivers in 
Idaho are deemed to have consented to an evidentiary breath or blood test if one is reasonably 
requested by a police officer. I.C. 5 18-8002(1) (2006). 
When Deputy Vrevich followed Defendant into her residence, Defendant was suspected 
to have been driving while under the influence of alcohol. There can be no question that the 
physical effects of any alcohol Defendant consumed were diminishing as time lapsed, as was the 
concentration of any alcohol contained in Defendant's blood. Had Deputy Vrevich remained 
outside Defendant's house until a warrant could be secured, valuable evidence would have been 
lost. The longer Defendant remained in her home, unattended by an officer, the more evidence 
was lost by the mere passage of time. Furthermore, left unattended, Defendant would have been 
able to actively destroy evidence by consuming additional amounts of alcohol, thereby 
destroying any evidence of the actual alcohol concentration in her body at the time she was 
suspected of driving while under the influence. Accordingly, the police had every reason to fear 
the loss of evidence if they failed to act, and exigent circumstances required they act precisely as 
they did. 
B. The Potential of Weapons Being Retrieved from Within the Residence 
Qualifies as Exigent Circumstances. 
In addition to the exigent circumstances presented by the potential destruction of 
evidence, Deputies Vrevich and McFarland were faced with the additional exigency presented by 
a possibility of a weapon being retrieved fiom Defendant's Residence. Exigencies which justify 
a warrantless entry of a home include "the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside 
or outside the dwelling." State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847,850,41 P.3d 275,278, 
(quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). The standard is objective, and the test is 
whether the facts and inferences known to the police at the time of entry would "warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." a. (quoting State v. 
Monroe, 101 Idaho 251,254, 61 1 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1980) (citation omitted)). See also State v. 
m, 138 Idaho 290,293 (Ct. App. 2003). 
In the present case, Deputies Vrevich and McFarland responded to a report of a domestic 
disturbance. The Defendant's son was the reporting party, who informed the officers upon their 
anival that his mother had left, intoxicated and upset. At the time Defendant went into her 
house, the entire course of events that prompted Defendant's son to call the police had not been 
sorted out. They officers had not yet had the time to fully investigate whether or not Defendant 
presented an individual danger to her son, herself, or the officers. In particular, they had no way 
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to know what access Defendant may have had to weapons inside her home. By going into the 
residence, the Defendant demonstrated her unwillingness to comply with a lawful police order to 
remain outside. It was thus necessary, out of concern for the safety of everyone present, for 
Deputy Vrevich to follow Defendant into her home. 
C. The Police Had Both Probable Cause to Believe that Evidence of a Crime 
Would be Found Inside Defendant's House and Probable Cause to Arrest 
Defendant. 
Probable cause to search exists when, "given all the circumstances, . . . there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 
m, 138 Idaho 18,23,56 P.3d 780,785 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S 
213,238 (1983)). Probable cause to arrest has been defined as information that "would lead a 
man of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that 
such person is guilty." State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449,776 P.2d 458,461 (1989). Said another 
way: 
The requirement of probable cause does not mean that arresting officers must have 
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Rather, the test is whether "the facts and 
circumstances within the officers" knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information were sufficient to w6ant  aprudent man &believingthat thk 
suspect had committed or was committing an offense. 
State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 36 P.3d 1287, 1290, (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 
U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223,225 (1964)) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). 
At the time Deputy Vrevich entered Defendant's house, he had probable cause to believe 
he would find evidence of a crime inside - namely, the Defendant, with the alcohol content of 
her breath and blood, as well as her physical displays of being under the influence of an 
intoxicant. Prior to entry, Deputy Vrevich had personally observed Defendant have difficulty 
walking into the house, appearing to be either intoxicated or have a physical impairment. He had 
also been informed that Defendant had driven by Deputy McFarland, on a public road, with what 
appeared to be a blank stare. Furthermore, he had been informed by Dispatch that Defendant's 
son had reported his mother as driving while intoxicated. Even without the additional facts 
known to Deputy McFarland, ie., Defendant's slurred speech, glossy and bloodshot eyes, and 
odor of alcoholic beverage, Deputy Vrevich had sufficient information to reasonably believe 
I 
I Defendant was concealing evidence of the crime of driving under the influence inside her house, 
simply by the fact of her presence there. 
The deputies also had probable cause to arrest Defendant for a crime at the time Deputy 
Vrevich entered Defendant's house. Based on the facts listed in the preceding paragraph, a man 
of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Defendant was 
guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Therefore, the probable cause prong of exigent circumstances analysis is satisfied in this 
case, whether the exigent circumstances were those presented by the potential destruction of 
evidence, or those presented by the concern that Defendant would retrieve a weapon from within 
the house. 
CONCLUSION 
At the heart of exigent circumstances analysis is the recognition that there are times when 
the "facts known to the police at the time of the entry, along with reasonable inferences drawn 
thereupon, demonstrate a 'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."' 
See State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290,293 (Ct. App. 2003). Clearfy, the officers in this case were 
-
faced with just such circumstances. They had probable cause to believe Defendant had 
committed a serious crime - driving under the influence, probable cause to believe evidence of 
that crime would be found in Defendant's residence once she entered it, and legitimate concerns 
regarding safety and the potential destruction of evidence. Had the officers waited to obtain a 
warrant, people could have been harmed, and valuable evidence would have been lost. The 
Magistrate Court was correct to deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress, and this Court should 
affirm the Magistrate Court's decision. 
DATED this & day of ,&!?c . ,2006. 
WILLIAM J. DOUGLAS 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
~ e ~ u t ~ ~ r o s e c u t i n ~  Attorney 
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Supreme Court granted review, 
superseding the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal. 
aoldings: The Supreme Court, Baxter, J., 
held that: 
(1)  oscers had probable cause to arrest 
defendant for driving under the influence 
(DUI), and 
(2) exigent circumstances justified 
Werdegar, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
Opinion, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 221, superseded. 
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Attorney, and Gerald McC. Franklin, 
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and Neal J. Kimball, Deputy District 
Attorney, for California District Attorneys 
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
BAXTER, J. 
**4 "814 A concerned citizen followed 
defendant, who was driving dangerously 
and under the influence of alcohol, through 
the streets of Santa Barbara in the early 
evening of July 21, 2003. Although 
defendant sped away *815 and managed to 
get home, the police, with that citizen's 
assistance, anived at the house a short time 
later. The officers spoke to defendant, 
who remained inside the house and was 
visibly intoxicated. When defendant 
refused to come outside to have his blood 
tested for the presence of alcohol, the 
police became anxious about the 
dissipation of alcohol ""5 in his 
bloodstream and entered the house without 
a warrant to arrest him for the criminal 
offense of driving under the influence 
(DUI). 
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Relying on Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 
U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 ( 
Welsh ), the Court of Appeal determined 
that the Fourth Amendment categorically 
prohibits warrantless entries into the home 
to effect a DUI arrest when the asserted 
exigency is merely to prevent the 
destruction of blood-alcohol evidence. 
Based on its conclusion that the arrest was 
unlawful, the Court of Appeal suppressed 
all the evidence seized during and after the 
warrantless entry. 
Because the Court of Appeal has misread 
Welsh and because exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless entry to effect the 
DUI arrest here, we reverse the Court of 
Appeal. We therefore need not consider 
the People's additional argument that even 
if the arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment, evidence seized outside the 
home subsequent to the arrest-including 
the results of a blood-alcohol test-are 
nonetheless admissible under New York v. 
Harris (1990) 495 U.S. 14, 1 10 S.Ct. 1640, 
109 L.Ed.2d 13. 
Background 
On July 21, 2003, Madelene Orvos 
returned to her apartment complex in Santa 
Barbara from a walk at the beach with her 
dogs. She found defendant Daniel Lyon 
Thompson passed out in a white Ford 
Bronco in her assigned parking space. A 
neighbor came out, woke defendant up, 
and asked him to leave. Before defendant 
left, Orvos saw him stumble around, toss 
an empty vodka bottle out of the Bronco, 
and pass out a second time in the vehicle. 
She could tell he was intoxicated. 
***753 Having seen defendant in this 
condition on many prior occasions, Orvos 
decided this time to follow defendant and 
called 91 1 to report the situation as she got 
into her car. Defendant ran a red light and 
drove about 70 miles per hour when he got 
onto the freeway, at one point going "way 
to his right ... close to the concrete on the 
side of the road." He exited the freeway 
and turned right onto State Street from the 
center lane. After defendant turned right 
onto South Ontare Road, Orvos fell behind 
because he was running stop signs and 
driving too fast in a neighborhood where 
children were present. Fortunately, Santa 
Barbara Police Officer Adrian Gutierrez 
arrived at 7:15 *816 p.m., just as Orvos 
lost track of the Bronco. Gutierrez 
instructed Orvos to wait at the parking lot 
of the nearby golf course while he 
continued the pursuit. 
Officer Gutierrez proceeded to 3610 San 
Jose Lane, which was the address of the 
Bronco's registered owner, and found the 
white Bronw parked in fiont. When 
Officer Ryan Dejohn anived to assist, 
Gutierrez went back to update Orvos and 
ask her to follow him to identifL the 
vehicle. After Orvos did so, Gutierrez 
touched the hood of the vehicle and 
discovered the hood was warm, indicating 
the Bronco had been driven very recently. 
He and Dejohn approached the front door, 
which was wide open, and rang the 
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doorbell. 
Slavka Kovarick answered the door. 
Officer Dejohn asked her who had been 
driving the Bronco. Kovarick said that 
Daniel owned the vehicle. Dejohn asked 
to speak to him, but Kovarick said he was 
asleep. When Dejohn asked whether she 
could wake Daniel up, Kovarick entered a 
bedroom directly to the left of the front 
door. She remained there a few moments 
and came back to tell them she could not 
wake Daniel up. She also refused to let 
the officers inside and instead walked away. 
Officer Dejohn heard people speaking 
softly down the hall and then saw a tall 
shirtless White male, about 45 years old, 
leave the house and go into the backyard. 
This man, later identified as defendant, 
matched the description ONOS had 
provided of the driver. When defendant 
turned around, he made eye contact with 
Dejohn, who motioned for him to come to 
the fiont door. Defendant reentered the 
house and approached the officers by 
exiting the bedroom door near the 
entryway. He was staggering or swaying 
slightly, slurring his speech, and gave off a 
strong odor of alcohol. Dejohn, who 
addressed defendant as Daniel, explained 
that they suspected him of driving under 
the influence of **6 alcohol and wanted to 
talk to him and perform some tests, but 
defendant refused to cooperate. As 
defendant began to walk away, Dejohn 
entered the house. He was afraid 
defendant might flee, so he placed his hand 
on defendant's shoulder. Defendant 
turned around and grabbed the doorjamb to 
the bedroom near the entryway. Officer 
Gutierrez entered the house only to assist 
Dejohn in effecting the arrest. 
After defendant was handcuffed, Owos 
identified defendant as the driver. His 
blood test revealed a blood-alcohol level. of 
0.21 percent. On the way to the jail, 
defendant told Officer Dejohn, "I'll kick 
your fucking ass." 
Following a hearing on defendant's motion 
to suppress, the trial court found there was 
probable cause to arrest defendant based 
on Orvos's report of the driver's behavior, 
defendant's resemblance to the description 
Owos "817 had provided of the driver, and 
defendant's visible intoxication. Under 
these circumstances, it was a "reasonable 
implication" that defendant was the driver. 
Relying on ***754PeopEe v. Hampron 
(1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 27, 209 Cal.Rptr. 
905, the trial court also found that the 
warrantless entry to arrest defendant was 
justified by exigent circumstances-i.e., the 
need to preserve the evidence of 
defendant's blood-alcohol level. 
Defendant then pleaded no contest to 
driving with a blood-alcohol level in 
excess of 0.08 percent (Veh.Code, $ 
23152, subd. (b)) and to resisting an officer 
in the performance of his duties (Pen.Code, 
$ 148, subd. (a)(l)) and admitted two prior 
convictions within the meaning of Vehicle 
Code section 23546. He was sentenced to 
24 months, execution of which was 
suspended for three years under specified 
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conditions. 
A divided panel of the Appellate Division 
of the Santa Barbara County Superior 
Court affirmed the denial of the 
suppression motion, relying on "[tlhe 
exigencies of preventing defendant from 
fleeing and possibly again driving while 
intoxicated, and of preserving evidence of 
his blood alcohol content." The Court of 
Appeal transferred the matter under rule 62 
of the California Rules of Court and 
reversed in a published opinion. The 
court disagreed that defendant "was likely 
to flee and again drive while intoxicated" 
and declared that the likelihood evidence 
of driving under the influence would be 
concealed or destroyed by the passage of 
time could not justify a warrantless entry 
into a residence under Welsh. 
We granted the People's petition for review. 
Discussion 
[1][2] "The Fourth Amendment protects ' 
[tlhe right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
' In conformity with the rule at common 
law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
where there is probable cause to believe 
that a criminal offense has been or is being 
committed." (Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 
543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 
L.Ed.2d 537.) When, as here, the arrest 
occurs in the home, additional principles 
come into play. "It is a 'basic principle of 
Fourth Amendment law' that searches and 
seizures inside a home without a warrant 
are presumptively unreasonable." (Payton 
v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 
S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639.) Indeed, "the 
'physical entry of the home is the chief 
evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed.' " (Id. at p. 
585, 100 S.Ct. 1371.) The requirement of 
a warrant "minimizes the danger of 
needless intrusions of that sort." (Id. at p. 
586, 100 S.Ct. 1371.) 
[3] Yet, as with so much of its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the high court 
has stopped short of erecting a categorical 
bar. The presumption of "818 
unreasonableness that attaches to a 
wanantless entry into the home " can be 
overcome by a showing of one of the few ' 
specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions' to the warrant requirement ( 
Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 
357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576), such 
as ' "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or 
imminent destruction of evidence, ... or the 
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the 
risk of danger to the police or to other 
persons inside or outside the dwelling3'**7 
' (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 
100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85). 
The United States Supreme Court has 
indicated that entry into a home based on 
exigent circumstances requires probable 
cause to believe that the entry is justified 
by one of these factors such as the 
imminent destruction of evidence or the 
need to prevent a suspect's escape." ( 
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People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676, 
16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.) 
***755 Defendant asserts that the 
warrantless entry here was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. He argues 
in particular that the police lacked probable 
cause to arrest him and that, even if 
probable cause existed, Welsh precluded a 
finding of exigent circumstances for 
warrantless DUI arrests in the home. 
The trial court found that probable cause 
existed to arrest defendant and that the 
warrantless entry was justified by exigent 
circumstances. Because the underlying 
facts are undisputed, we review the trial 
court's rulings independently. (People v. 
Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301, 248 
Cal.Rptr. 834,756 P.2d 221.) 
A. Did Probable Cause Exist to Justify 
an Arrest of Defendant for DUI? 
[4][5][6][7] We first consider whether the 
officers had probable cause to arrest 
defendant for DUI. "Probable cause exists 
when the facts known to the arresting 
officer would persuade someone of ' 
reasonable caution' that the person to be 
arrested has committed a crime. 
[Citation.] '[Plrobable cause is a fluid 
concept-turning on the assessment of 
probabilities in particular factual contexts ... 
.' (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 
232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.) It 
is incapable of precise definition. ( 
Maiyland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 
371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769.) ' " 
The substance of all the definitions of 
probable cause is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt," ' and that belief must be ' 
particularized with respect to the person to 
be ... seized.' (Ibid.)" (People v. Celis, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 
85,93 P.3d 1027.) 
That standard was satisfied here. 
Although Madelene Orvos did not see 
defendant drinking, she did see him have 
difficulty walking, toss an empty "819 
vodka bottle out of the Bronco, and pass 
out again in the vehicle. When he woke 
up, he drove erratically and too fast. He 
also ran red lights and stop signs. As 
defendant concedes, the record fully 
supported Orvos's belief, which she 
communicated to the police, that the driver 
of the Bronco was intoxicated. Orvos's 
report thus established probable cause to 
justify a warrantless arrest of the Bronco's 
driver. (Veh.Code, $ 40300.5; People v. 
Schofield (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 968, 
972-975, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429; see 
generally People v. Smith (1976) 17 
Cal.3d 845, 852, 132 Ca1.Rptr. 397, 553 
P.2d 557 [citizen-informant who has 
personally observed the commission of a 
crime "is presumptively reliable"].) 
The officers also had ample justification 
for suspecting that defendant had been the 
driver of the Bronco. The registered 
owner of the vehicle lived at 3610 San Jose 
Lane. A Bronco was parked in front of that 
residence, and Orvos confmed that this 
was the vehicle she had just been 
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following. Officer Gutierrez touched the 
Bronco's hood and concluded that it had 
been driven very recently. The officers 
went to the door and inquired who had 
been driving the Bronco. Slavka Kovarick 
said that the Bronco belonged to Daniel 
and that she "was going to call Daniel out" 
to speak to them. Kovarick went into the 
bedroom immediately to the left of the 
front door and came out a short time later 
to say she could not wake Daniel up. 
Shortly thereafter, Officer Dejohn heard 
quiet voices coming from down the hall 
and then saw defendant, a tall White male, 
approximately 45 years old and shirtless, 
walk out the back door. At Dejohn's 
invitation, defendant walked back into the 
house and approached the entryway by 
exiting through the bedroom door 
immediately to the left of the front door. 
He was staggering and swaying, slurring 
his speech, and smelled of alcohol. His 
appearance***756 and demeanor matched 
the description of the driver provided by 
Orvos. He also had walked into and out 
of the bedroom that belonged to Daniel. 
The officers, having reasonable grounds 
for believing that defendant was Daniel 
and that Daniel was the driver, thus had 
probable cause to arrest him for DUI. 
**8 Defendant claims probable cause was 
nonetheless lacking because the 
description Owos had provided was too 
general to justify suspicion of any 
individual person. He cites People v. 
Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 74 Cal.Rptr. 
713, 450 P.2d 33, in which a "cursory 
description" of the suspect's race, color of 
clothing, and presence in the neighborhood 
where a prowler has been reported was 
deemed sufficient to justify a detention but 
not an arrest (id. at p. 350, 74 Cal.Rptr. 
713, 450 P.2d 33), and on People v. 
Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 30 
Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658, in which the 
suspect's description as a fairly tall White 
man of large build with dark hair and a red 
sweater likewise failed to justify the arrest 
of a man matching that description who 
was merely in the "neighborhood" where a 
robbery had occurred more than 20 
minutes earlier and was "driving toward 
the scene of the crime, not away from it." ( 
Id. at pp. 450, 454, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 
P.2d 658.) But we have in this case much 
more than a vague description *820 of a 
suspect that happens to be matched by 
someone in the general neighborhood 
where a crime occurred. The Bronco was 
traced to a particular residence by its 
registration as well as by Orvos's visual 
identification and the fact the engine was 
still warm. Kovarick told the officers that 
Daniel, the owner of the Bronco, was 
indeed home and that she would tell him to 
come to the door. Only then did a man 
matching Orvos's description attempt to 
flee from the house, although he eventually 
came to the door-after passing through 
Daniel's bedroom. When the man arrived 
at the front door, the officers immediately 
could tell that he was intoxicated. These 
additional facts soundly distinguish Curtis 
and Mickelson. (People v. Schader (1965) 
62 Cal.2d 716, 724, 44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 
P.2d 665; In re Louis F. (1978) 85 
Cal.App.3d 611, 616, 149 Cal.Rptr. 642 [" 
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Curtis and Mickelson should not be 
understood as standing for the proposition 
identification data furnished to a police 
officer can never alone be sufficient to 
justify a warrantless arrest unless there 
could not have been anyone other than the 
person arrested who could have fit the 
description. Rather, the question is one of 
degree. And when identification 
information of the kind here present is 
buttressed by additional probative evidence 
of complicity, it cannot be maintained 
probable cause was lacking"].) 
[8] Defendant also errs in supposing that 
the officers' lack of certainty defendant was 
the driver precludes a finding of probable 
cause. " '[Slufficient probability, not 
certainty, is the touchstone of 
reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment.' " (Maryland v. Garrison 
(1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 
L.Ed.2d 72.) 
B. Did Exigent Circumstances JustiQ a 
Warrantless Entry to Effect the Arrest? 
[9][10] The imminent destruction of 
evidence is an exigent circumstance 
justifying a warrantless entry into a 
residence to effect an arrest. (People v. 
Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 676, 16 
Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.) The 
People contend that the. body's 
metabolization of alcohol qualified as the 
imminent destruction of evidence 
justifying a warrantless entry. Defendant 
disagrees, relying largely on Welsh. 
Welsh held that the need to ascertain a 
suspect's blood-alcohol level did not justify 
a warrantless entry into a residence to 
effect an arrest for driving under the 
influencex**757 in Wisconsin. (Welsh, 
supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 753-754, 104 S.Ct. 
2091.) Welsh did not dispute the 
evanescent character of evidence of 
intoxication. Rather, the high court 
invalidated' the arrest because "an 
important factor to be considered when 
determining whether any exigency exists is 
the gravity of the underlying offense for 
which the arrest is being made." (Id. at p. 
753, 104 S.Ct. 2091; see also Brigharn 
City v. Stuart (May 22, 2006, No. 05-502) 
--- U.S. ----, ---- , 126 S.Ct 1943, --- 
L.Ed.2d ---- [2006 WL 1374566, 31.)  " 
[Tlhe best indication of the State's interest 
in precipitating *821 an arrest," the court 
explained, is the classification of the 
offense and the possible punishment, 
which "can be easily identified both by the 
courts and by officers faced with a decision 
to arrest." (Welsh, supra, at p. 754, 104 
S.Ct. 2091 .) 
Defendant, like the Court of Appeal here, 
reasons that DUI is likewise a minor 
offense in California and, under Welsh, 
cannot justify **9 a warrantless entry to 
effect an arrest. We disagree. Wisconsin 
has chosen to classify a first offense for 
DUI as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture 
offense for which no imprisonment is 
possible. (Welsh, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 
754, 104 S.Ct. 2091, citing Wis. Stat. 4 
346.65(2) (1975).) The issue thus 
presented in Welsh, as the high court 
O 2006 ThornsodWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page 12 of 30 
135 P.3d 3 Page 11 
38 Cal.4th 81 1, 135 P.3d 3,43 Cal.Rptr.3d 750, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4587,2006 Daily Journal D.A.R 
(Cite as: 38 Cal.4th 811,135 P.3d 3) 
explicitly stated, was whether " the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police from 
making a warrantless night entry of a 
person's home in order to arrest him for a 
nonjailable traffic offense." (Welsh, 
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 742, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 
italics added.) California, by contrast, 
classifies a first offense for driving under 
the influence as a criminal act that is 
punishable by no more than six months 
and no less than 96 hours in jail. ( 
Veh.Code, 23536, subd. (a).) The 
possibility of imprisonment distinguishes 
DUI in California from DUI in Wisconsin. 
Other factors confim that, in California, 
driving under the influence is not an " 
extremely minor" offense within the 
meaning of Welsh, supra, 466 U.S. at page 
753, 104 S.Ct. 2091. When the 
Legislature amended Vehicle Code section 
40300.5 to allow warrantless arrests for 
this misdemeanor offense not committed in 
the presence of the officer, it found and 
declared "that driving while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs continues to 
pose a substantial danger to public health 
and safety, injuring over 65,000 people per 
year and killing an additional 2,400. 
Given the severity of the conduct involved, 
the exception in Section 40300.5 of the 
Vehicle Code from the general 
requirements of Section 836 of the Penal 
Code should be expanded to cover other 
instances in which the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person 
to be arrested had been driving while under 
the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both." 
(Stats.1984, ch. 722, 2, pp. 2646-2647; 
see also People v. SchoJield, supra, 90 
Cal.App.4th at p. 973, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429 
["The Legislature has recognized that 
driving under the influence is widespread 
and serious with potential for catastrophic 
consequences"].) This court, too, has 
recognized the "monstrous proportions of 
the problem" as well as "the horrific risk 
posed by those who drink and drive" (Burg 
v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 
262, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732) and 
has declared its "resolve to support 'all 
possible means of deterring persons from 
driving automobiles after drinking.' " ( 
Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 3 1 
Cal.3d 147, 155, 181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 
P.2d 1305.) We therefore believe Welsh 
was limited to Wisconsin's "amazing" 
decision to classify DUI as a civil 
nonjailable offense (Welsh, supra, 466 
U.S. at p. 755, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (conc. opn. 
of Blackmun, J.)) and not as a categorical 
bar on warrantless arrests in the home for 
DUI in the vast majority of states that, like 
California, classify it as a ***758 crime 
with the possibility of imprisonment. "822 
(People v. Hampton, supra, 164 
Cal.App.3d 27, 34, 209 Cal.Rptr. 905; see 
also Welsh, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 761, 104 
S.Ct. 2091 (dis. opn. of White, J.) ["a 
bright-line distinction between felonies and 
misdemeanors is untenable"; "the 
Court-wisely in my view-does not adopt 
such an approach"].) 
Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 
121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (McArthur 
), which construed the scope of exigent 
circumstances in the related circumstance 
I 
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of preventing a suspect from entering his 
own home, provides additional support for 
our understanding of Welsh. In McArthur, 
the police suspected that marijuana had 
been hidden underneath the couch of the 
trailer where McArthur was living. The 
police informed McArthur of their 
suspicions and asked for permission to 
search the trailer, which McArthur denied. 
While one officer went to get a search 
warrant, McArthur was told he could not 
reenter the trailer unless an officer 
accompanied him. McArthur then 
reentered the trailer two or three times, and 
each time an officer stood just inside the 
door to observe what McArthur did. 
About two hours later, an officer returned 
with the warrant and found a small amount 
of marijuana in the trailer. (McArthur, 
supra, 531 U.S. at p. 329, 121 S.Ct. 946.) 
Relying on Welsh, McArthur argued that 
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 
which was punishable in Illinois by up to 
30 days in jail, was too minor an offense to 
justify the warrantless restraint he had 
suffered. (McArthur, at pp. 335-336, 121 
S.Ct. 946.) The high court disagreed, 
reiterating that " 'the penalty that may 
attach to any particular offense seems to 
**I0 provide the clearest and most 
consistent indication of the State's interest 
in arresting individuals suspected of 
committing that offense' " (id. at p. 336, 
121 S.Ct. 946, quoting Welsh, supra, 466 
U.S. at p. 754, fn. 14, 104 S.Ct. 2091.) and 
finding "significant distinctions" between " 
crimes that were 'jailable,' not ' 
nonjailable.' " (McArthur, at p. 336, 121 
S.Ct. 946; see also id. at p. 337, 121 S.Ct. 
946 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.) [observing 
that the risk of destruction of evidence of 
the misdemeanor would have justified a 
warrantless entry into the trailer].) 
A substantial majority of our sister 
jurisdictions have limited Welsh's holding 
to nonjailable offenses and have thereby 
rejected defendant's extension of its rule to 
misdemeanor offenses where 
imprisonment is a potential penalty. ( 
Mendez v. People (Colo.1999) 986 P.2d 
275, 283 [distinguishing Welsh as 
involving "a minor, civil, nonjailable 
offense"]; Dolan v. Salinas 
(Conn.Super.Ct.1999) 1999 WL 566943, 
*4, 1999 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1988, *13 [" 
Unlike the State of Wisconsin, Connecticut 
provides for incarceration on a first 
conviction" for DUI]; Dyer v. State 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) 680 So.2d 612, 613 
[a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year 
in jail is "classified as a much more serious 
offense than in Welsh "I; i'%reatl v. State 
(1999) 240 Ga.App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276, 
280 (Iltreatt ) [distinguishing Welsh 
because DUI, which is punishable by 
imprisonment of 10 days to 12 months, is " 
sufficiently serious criminal activity to 
justify an officer's warrantless, 
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home 
to arrest the suspect"]; People v. Lagle 
(1990) 200 IIl.App.3d 948, 146 I1l.Dec. 
551, 558 N.E.2d 514, 519 [distinguishing 
Welsh because *823 DUI, a misdemeanor, 
is "considered a serious offense in Illinois" 
1; State v. Legg (Iowa 2001) 633 N.W.2d 
763, 773 [distinguishing Welsh because 
DUI, which is punishable by two days to 
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one year in jail, is a "serious misdemeanor" 
1; State v. Paul (Minn.1996) 548 N.W.2d 
260, 267 [distinguishing Welsh because 
DUI is a misdemeanor***759 and the 
legislature had authorized warrantless 
arrests for this offense when it occurs 
outside the officer's presence]; City of 
Kirhville v. Guffey (Mo.Ct.App. 1987) 740 
S.W.2d 227, 229 [distinguishing Welsh 
because DUI is punishable by up to six 
months in jail]; State v. Ellinger (1986) 
223 Mont. 349, 725 P.2d 1201, 1204 
[distinguishing Welsh because DUI is a 
criminal offense with the possibility of 
imprisonment]; State v. Nikola 
(App.Div.2003) 359 N.J.Super. 573, 821 
A.2d 110, 118 [distinguishing Welsh 
because "in this State a charge of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol may 
subject an offender to a jail term of up to 
thirty days even for a first offense"]; 
People v. Odenweller (1988) 137 A.D.2d 
15, 527 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 [distinguishing 
Welsh because DUI is punishable by up to 
one year in jail]; Beachwood v. Sims 
(1994) 98 Ohio App.3d 9, 647 N.E.2d 821, 
825 [distinguishing Welsh because DUI is 
a misdemeanor punishable by a minimum 
term of three days in jail]; State v. Roberts 
(1985) 75 Or.App. 292, 706 P.2d 564, 566 
[distinguishing Welsh because DUI is a 
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year 
in jail]; Beaver v. State (Tex.App.2003) 
106 S.W.3d 243, 248 [distinguishing Welsh 
"ti-om cases, such as this one, where the 
offense is 'jailable' "I; City of Orem v. 
Henrie (Utah Ct.App.1994) 868 P.2d 1384, 
1392 [distinguishing Welsh because DUI is 
a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment]; Cherry v. Com. (2004) 44 
Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 307 ["if any 
bright line exists for warrantless entries 
into the home, it should be drawn between 
jailable and nonjailable offenses rather 
than between felonies and misdemeanors" 
1; State v. Grvjth (1991) 61 Wash.App. 
35, 808 P.2d 1171, 1176 & fn. 7 
[distinguishing Welsh as a case involving a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense 
without possible imprisonment]; Goines v. 
James (1993) 189 W.Va. 634, 433 S.E.2d 
572, 577-578 [distinguishing Welsh 
because DUI is a serious traffic offense 
punishable by up to six months in jail]; 
State v. Hughes (2000) 233 Wis.2d 280, 
607 N.W.2d 621, 631 [distinguishing Welsh 
because the misdemeanor offense was 
punishable by up to six months in jail]; 
Rideout v. State (Wyo.2005) 122 P.3d 201, 
210 ["The unmistakable implication of the 
discussion in McArthur is that the 
distinction drawn by the Court in Welsh 
between minor offenses that do not justify 
a warrantless entry into a residence and 
those offenses that do is predicated upon 
whether the subject offense carries a 
potential jail term"]; accord, **11Joyce v. 
Town of Tewhbuuy, Mass. (1st (3.1997) 
112 F.3d 19, 22 (en banc) ["the fact that 
Massachusetts classifies the alleged 
violation here as a misdemeanor does not 
reduce it to a 'minor offense' " within the 
meaning of Welsh I.).) 
*824 Against this impressive array of 
authority, we have found only three courts 
that, like the Court of Appeal below, have 
extended Welsh to misdemeanors canying 
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a possibility of imprisonment. In Patzner 
v. Burkett (8th Cir. 1985) 779 F.2d 1363, 
the Eighth Circuit asserted, without much 
analysis, that the punishment for DUI in 
North Dakota-a minimum sentence of a 
$100 fine or three days in jail-was only a " 
minor difference in penalty" and thus was " 
not sufficient to support a result different 
from that reached in Welsh," inasmuch as 
the state had since amended its statute to 
eliminate the possibility of imprisonment 
for first-time offenders. (Patzner, supra, 
779 F.2d at pp. 1368-1369 & fn. 6.) In 
State v. Flegel (S.D.1992) 485 N.W.2d 210, 
the South Dakota Supreme Court made 
the remarkable assertion that the 
misdemeanor penalties for first-offense 
DUI, which ranged up to one year in jail, 
were "similar" to those attaching to the 
nonjailable traffic offense in Welsh and the 
misdemeanor penalties in Patzner. ( 
Flegel, supra, 485 N.W.2d at p. 215.) 
And in ***760 Norris v. State (1999) 338 
Ark. 397, 993 S.W.2d 918, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that DUI, which was 
punishable by up to one year in jail, was " 
relatively minor" when compared to 
criminal offenses involving violence or the 
threat of violence. (Id. at p. 923; but see 3 
LaFave, Search and Seizure (4th ed.2004) 5 
6.1(.f), p. 316, fn. 211 [criticizing Norris 
I.)) 
We do not find these decisions persuasive. 
First of all, they ignore Welsh itself, which 
cautions that the critical factor is not the 
nature of the crime but "the penalty that 
may attach to any particular offense." ( 
Welsh, 466 U.S. at p. 754, fn. 14, 104 S.Ct. 
2091; see also Colb, The Qualitative 
Dimension of Fourth Amendment " 
Reasonableness " (1 998) 98 Colum. 
L.Rev. 1642, 1683 ["If Wisconsin were 
unhappy with the Court's decision, it could, 
therefore, nullify it prospectively by simply 
changing (legislatively) the status of 
driving while intoxicated from a civil 
violation to a criminal offense''].) Indeed, 
they all predate McArthur, which clarified 
that the significant distinction for Fourth 
Amendment purposes in an analogous 
context is whether the crimes were " ' 
jailable' " or " 'nonjailable.' " (McArthur, 
supra, 531 U.S. at p. 336, 121 S.Ct. 946.) 
Moreover, none of these cases 
acknowledges the substantial weight of 
authority limiting Welsh to nonjailable 
offenses-or even cites a single contrary 
case. Finally, a bright-line rule limiting 
warrantless entries to felonies "would send 
a message to the 'bad man' who drinks 
and drives that a hot pursuit or arrest set in 
motion can be thwarted by beating the 
police to one's door. The Fourth 
Amendment simply cannot be stretched 
nor can public safety be ensured by a 
bright-line felony rule which would 
encourage drunk drivers to elude the police 
by racing through the streets to the 
sanctuary of their houses in order to 'freeze 
' a hot pursuit or to otherwise evade a 
lawful arrest." (State v. Paul, supra, 548 
N. W.2d at p. 268.) 
If, as we have concluded, a finding of 
exigent circumstances in DUI cases is not 
categorically precluded by Welsh, we must 
next consider whether "825 exigent 
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circumstances justified the warrantless 
entry in this particular case. The People 
rely on the exception to the warrant 
requirement for the imminent destruction 
of evidence. They point out (1) that 
defendant's blood-alcohol level would have 
diminished while the police sought a 
warrant as the body metabolized the 
alcohol, and (2) that defendant could have 
masked his blood-alcohol level while the 
police sought a warrant by ingesting more 
alcohol. The People's concerns are well 
founded. 
It is beyond dispute that "the percentage of 
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish 
shortly after drinking stops, as the body 
functions to eliminate it from the system." 
(Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 
757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908.) 
Because the "delay necessary to procure a 
warrant ... may result in the destruction of 
valuable evidence," "blood and breath 
samples taken to measure whether these 
substances were in the bloodstream when a 
triggering event occurred must be obtained 
as soon as possible." **12(Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives' Assn. (1989) 
489 U.S. 602, 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 
L.Ed.2d 639.) Neither defendant nor the 
dissenting opinion here offers any reason 
why the dissipation of blood-alcohol 
evidence may be deemed to threaten the 
imminent destruction of evidence in 
Schmerber and in Skinner but not in this 
case. Nor does defendant offer any 
authority for his assertion at oral argument 
that the exigent circumstance relating to 
the imminent destruction of evidence 
encompasses only that evidence which 
qualifies as contraband or as an 
instrumentality of a crime. To the 
contrary,***761 most courts have 
concluded that the dissipation of 
blood-alcohol evidence "may constitute an 
exigent circumstance under the facts of a 
particular case." (City of Orem v. Henrie, 
supra, 868 P.2d at p. 1389; accord, 
Threatt, supra, 524 S.E.2d at p. 281, fn. 1 [ 
"when an officer has probable cause to 
arrest for the offense of DUI, the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence (which 
may occur by the dissipation of alcohol 
from a DUI suspect's blood while a warrant 
is obtained) may constitute an exigent 
circumstance which could justify a 
nonconsensual, warrantless entry into the 
suspect's home to arrest the suspect"]; 
State v. Komoto (1985) 40 Wash.App. 200, 
697 P.2d 1025, 1033 ["This proposition is 
generally accepted by federal and state 
courts"]; State v. Bohling (1 993) 173 
Wis.2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399, 404-405 
[citing cases]; U.S. v. Reid (4th Cir.1991) 
929 F.2d 990,993-994.) FN1 
FNI. The dissent concedes that the 
dissipation of blood-alcohol 
evidence may constitute an exigent 
circumstance to justify a 
warrantless entry to effect an arrest, 
but would limit such arrests to 
crimes "far more serious than mere 
driving under the influence." (Dis. 
opn., post, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 767, 
135 P.3d at p. 17.) The text of the 
Fourth Amendment, however, 
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offers no basis for distinguishing 
between DUI, which is a serious 
and jailable offense in California 
(see ante, at pp. 757-758, 135 P.3d 
at pp. 8-9), and the crimes alleged 
in Henrie and Komoto, nor does the 
dissent point to any case law to 
support such a distinction. Indeed, 
inasmuch as the dissent concedes 
that the nonjailable offense in Welsh 
is distinguishable from the jailable 
offense in this case (dis. opn., post, 
at p. 765, 135 P.3d at p. 15), the 
line the dissent would draw 
between this case and Henrie or 
Komoto remains undefined. 
*826 Defendant contends that no exigency 
existed because there is a rebuttable 
presumption that a driver had a 
blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or 
more at the time of driving if the person 
had a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent 
or more in a chemical test performed " 
within three hours after the driving." ( 
Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (b).) Defendant 
misapprehends the significance of this 
provision, which is not a presumption at 
all, but only a permissive inference. 
(Judicial Council of Cal., Jury Instns. 
(2006) Bench Note to CALCRIM No. 
21 11, p. 149; accord, Use Note to CALJIC 
No. 12.61.1 (Jan.2005 ed.) p. 845.) That 
the jury may, but is not required to, 
conclude that defendant's blood-alcohol 
level was in excess of legal limits based on 
a test taken within three hours of the 
driving does not eviscerate the People's 
interest in securing a blood test as soon as 
possible. (State v. Bohling, supra, 494 
N.W.2d at p. 405; City of Orem v. Henrie, 
supra, 868 P.2d at p. 1393, fn. 10 [such a 
limitation "evinces the Legislature's intent 
to promote the rapid attainment of 
chemical tests for alcohol content"].) 
[ l l ]  We are likewise unpersuaded by 
defendant's claim that any exigency is 
eliminated because of the possibility an 
expert could testify about the defendant's 
blood-alcohol level at an earlier point "by 
extrapolating backward from the 
later-taken results." As courts have 
recognized, "such extrapolations can be 
speculative." (State v. Bohling, supra, 494 
N.W.2d at p. 405.) "[Tlhere are numerous 
variables such as weight, or time and 
content of last meal which may affect the 
rate at which the alcohol dissipates." ( 
Carleton v. Superior Court (1985) 170 
Cal.App.3d 1182, 1185, 216 Cal.Rptr. 890; 
see also Bennett v. Cornan (1987) 178 
W.Va. 500, 361 S.E.2d 465, 469 [degree of 
physical exertion can affect body's 
metabolism of alcohol].) FN2 
FN2. Defendant also argues that a 
person suspected of DUI may 
refuse to submit to chemical testing 
and accept the specified 
punishment, rendering the 
blood-alcohol evidence 
superfluous. Defendant once again 
misapprehends the statutory 
scheme. A person who drives a 
motor vehicle "is deemed to have 
given his or her consent to 
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chemical testing" of his or her 
blood, breath, or urine for the 
purpose of determining the 
alcoholic or drug content of his or 
her blood (Veh.Code, 23612, 
subds.(a)(l)(A) & (£41, (d)(2)). "It 
is thus firmly established that a 
drunken driver has no right to resist 
or refuse such a test." (Bush v. 
Bright (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 
792, 71 Cal.Rptr. 123.) Moreover, 
the possibility of sanctions under 
Vehicle Code section 13353 for the 
driver's refusal to submit to 
chemical tests does not preclude 
the People from also obtaining a 
blood sample without any further 
approval, based on the consent any 
driver has given under section 
23612, and punishing the driver for 
the criminal act of driving under 
the influence. (Covington v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles 
(1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 54, 60, 162 
Cal.Rptr. 150; People v. Fite 
(1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 685, 
690-691,73 Cal.Rptr. 666.) 
***762 **I3 In any event, none of 
defendant's arguments is responsive to the 
corruption of evidence that occurs when 
the suspect takes advantage of any delay to 
ingest more alcohol-or to claim to have 
done so-or when the suspect evades police 
capture until he or she is no longer 
intoxicated. Numerous courts have 
recognized this possibility as an additional 
reason supporting a finding of exigent 
circumstances in DUI cases. *827(Welsh, 
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 763, 104 S.Ct. 2091 
(dis. opn. of White, J.); State v. Lovig 
(Iowa 2004) 675 N.W.2d 557, 566 & fn. 2; 
State v. Legg, supra, 633 N.W.2d at pp. 
772-773; State v. Seamans, supra, 2005 
Me.Super. LEXIS 105, * I  1, fn. 3; State v. 
Paul, supra, 548 N.W.2d at p. 267; City of 
Kirksville v. Gufey, supra, 740 S.W.2d at 
p. 229; People v. Odenweller, supra, 527 
N.Y.S.2d at p. 129; Stark v. N Y. State 
Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1984) 104 
A.D.2d 194, 483 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826-827, 
affd. (1985) 65 N.Y.2d 720, 492 N.Y.S.2d 
8, 9, 481 N.E.2d 548; City of Orem v. 
Henrie, supra, 868 P.2d at p. 1393; State 
v. Komoto, supra, 697 P.2d at p. 1033.) In 
this case, the corruption of evidence was 
not merely a theoretical possibility. The 
officers had good reason to believe that 
defendant, who had attempted to flee out 
the back door upon learning of their 
presence, would escape again or otherwise 
act to conceal his intoxication if given the 
opportunity. (See People v. Murphy 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 490, 500, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 
125, 123 P.3d 155.) Time was of the 
essence here. 
In holding that exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless entry here, we 
need not decide-and do not hold-that the 
police may enter a home without a warrant 
to effect an arrest of a DUI suspect in every 
case. We hold merely that the police 
conduct here, taking into account ail of the 
circumstances, was reasonable-with 
reasonableness measured as " 'a balance 
between the public interest and the 
individual's right to personal secuxity free 
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from arbitrary interference by law officers.' 
" (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 
U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 
331; accord, People v. Rarney (1976) 16 
Cal.3d 263, 276, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 
P.2d 1333 ["There is no ready litmus test 
for determining whether such 
circumstances exist, and in each case the 
claim of an extraordinary situation must be 
measured by the facts known to the officers 
"I.) 
The state's interest in effecting an arrest 
here was substantial. There was strong 
evidence that defendant had committed the 
dangerous act of DUI, a jailable offense. 
Officer Dejohn feared, however, the 
evidence of that crime was in imminent 
danger of destruction. His suspicions 
were justified. Slavka Kovarick had told 
the police, alternately, that defendant 
would be coming to the door soon, and that 
he was asleep and could not be woken up, 
but he was in fact neither sleeping nor 
coming to the door. Instead, he spoke 
quietly in the hall with Kovarick and then 
***763 walked away from the officers into 
the backyard. The police were able to see 
defendant leave the house only because the 
front door was open, and defendant 
returned to the house only after Officer 
Dejohn made eye contact with him and. 
motioned for him to come back in. 
Having attempted to flee once, defendant 
was at risk of doing so again if he was not 
promptly taken into custody. Had he 
escaped, the evidence of his crime would 
have dissipated. Even if he had been 
prevented from escaping, he had already 
demonstrated plainly his desire to evade 
police investigation and could have 
corrupted the evidence simply by resuming 
"828 drinking. The police thus had ample 
cause to believe defendant was inside the 
house and that the evidence was at risk of 
imminent destruction, as the superior court 
found. (Cf. Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399 
U.S. 30, 34-35, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 
409 [no exigency existed where the 
officers had no basis for suspecting anyone 
was inside the house or about to destroy 
the narcotics].) 
The Court of Appeal emphasized in 
particular that the police had not conducted 
a hot **I4 pursuit in that the pursuit was 
initiated by a citizen and the police did not 
observe defendant driving or entering the 
house. Even if the definition of hot 
pursuit were to exclude the situation here 
(but see People v. Escudero (1979) 23 
Cal.3d 800, 810, 153 Cal.Rptr. 825, 592 
P.2d 312 ["it is not necessary that the 
suspect be kept physically in view at all 
times"] ), it is clear that defendant had 
arrived at the house only minutes before 
the police. The police thus had reasonable 
cause to believe the evidence of 
defendant's intoxication would be fresh at 
the time of his arrest. 
The intrusion on defendant's privacy, by 
contrast, was a diminished one. Kovarick 
had left the front door wide open during 
the entire encounter. This not only 
rendered a forcible entry unnecessary, but 
it exposed to public view the very area 
where the arrest would later occur. (Cf. 
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U.S. v. Gori (2d Cir.2000) 230 F.3d 44, 53 
["Once the apartment was opened to public 
view by the defendants in response to the 
knock of an invitee, there was no 
expectation of privacy as to what could be 
seen from the hall"]; U.S. v. Vaneaton (9th 
Cir.1995) 49 F.3d 1423, 1427.) 
Moreover, Officer Dejohn entered only a 
few feet beyond the threshold, and Officer 
Gutierrez followed only when it became 
apparent that his assistance was necessary 
to overcome defendant's resistance. 
Neither conducted a search of the 
residence. In short, the state's intrusion 
into the home was the minimum necessary 
to effect the arrest and extended only to 
areas already exposed to public view. 
Under these circumstances, it was 
reasonable for the police to enter the home 
without a warrant in order to arrest 
defendant and thereby prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence of his 
crime. FN3 
FN3. To the extent dictum in 
People v. Schofield, supra, 90 
Cal.App.4th at pages 970 and 975, 
109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429, is inconsistent 
with the views expressed herein, it 
is disapproved. 
In light of our holding, we find it 
unnecessary to address the People's 
additional argument that even if the 
warrantless entry had violated the Fourth 
Amendment, the exclusionary rule would 
not extend to the officers' observations of 
defendant outside the house, any 
statements defendant made prior to the 
entry or after defendant was removed from 
the house, or the results of his 
blood-alcohol test. (See New York v. 
Harris, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 19, 110 S.Ct. 
1640; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
553, 569, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418.) 
*829 Disposition 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
reversed. 
***764 WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J., 
KENNARD, CHIN, MORENO, and 
CORRIGAN, JJ. 
Dissenting Opinion by WERDEGAR, J. 
"A man's house is his castle." (Miller v. 
United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 
S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332.) This phrase 
expresses the view that one's home is a 
place of personal privacy and its 
inhabitants are entitled to freedom from 
govemmental intrusion absent a very good 
reason. "At the risk of belaboring the 
obvious, private residences are places in 
which the individual normally expects 
privacy free of governmental intrusion not 
authorized by a warrant, and that 
expectation is plainly one that society is 
prepared to recognize as justifiable." ( 
United States v. Karo (1984) 468 U.S. 705, 
714, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530, 
quoted with approval in People v. Camacho 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 831, 98 
Cal.Rptr.2d 232, 3 P.3d 878.) "We have, 
after all, lived our whole national history 
with an understanding of 'the ancient 
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adage that a man's home is his castle [to 
the point that t]he poorest man may in his 
cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown.' " (Georgia v. Randolph (2006) --- 
U.S. ----, ----, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 1524, 164 
L.Ed.2d 208.) 
Not just some forgotten vestige of 15th 
century English law that allowed English 
peasants to assert their rights against a 
powerful monarchy, the view that one's 
home is a place of privacy was also shared 
by the Framers of the United States 
Constitution. We need not interpret or 
gloss the constitutional text for hidden or 
obscure meaning, for the drafters of the 
Fourth Amendment made this point plain 
on the face of the document: '"1.5 "The 
right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause." (U.S. 
Const., 4th Amend., italics added.) 
The United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized repeatedly the primacy of the 
constitutional protection for persons in 
their homes. " '[Plhysical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.' " (Payton v. New York (1980) 
445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 
L.Ed.2d 639.) "At the very core [of the 
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion." (Silverman v. United States 
(1961) 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 
L.Ed.2d 734.) The high court has been 
vigilant in extending this concept in the 
face of new technological threats to the 
sanctity of the home. (See Kyllo v. United 
States (2001) 533 U.S. 27, 28, 121 S.Ct. 
2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 [warrantless use of 
"830 a thermal imaging device to explore 
detdils inside home violated 4th Amend.]; 
United States v. Karo, supra, 468 U.S. 
705, 104 S.Ct 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 
[warrantless placement of a beeper into a 
home violated 4th Amend.].) 
This court has also on numerous occasions 
recognized this special constitutional 
protection for persons in their homes. For 
example, we held a warrantless search of a 
suspect's home could not be justified by a 
parole search condition of which police 
were unaware (People v. Sanders (2003) 
3 1 Cal.4th 3 18, 324, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 
P.3d 496); that, absent more, the 
warrantless entry into a suspect's home was 
not justified solely by the arrest of the 
suspect outside the home (People v. Celis 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 
85, 93 P.3d 1027); that a person's 
expectation of privacy in the home was not 
compromised by his exposure of the 
home's interior to a private side yard 
***765(People v. Camacho, supra, 23 
Cal.4th 824, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 232, 3 P.3d 
878); and that the presumptive 
constitutional protection of the home 
extended to an attached garage (People v. 
Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795, 97 
Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311; see Cal. 
Const., art. I, $ 13). Perhaps our seminal 
case in this area is People v. Ramey (1976) 
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16 Cal.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 
1333, where we held the warrantless entry 
into a suspect's home to make an arrest, 
even though supported by probable cause 
to believe he was guilty of a felony, was 
unreasonable per se under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the state Constitution, at 
least in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. Four years later, the United 
States Supreme Court came to this view 
itself, holding in Payton v. New York that, 
in the absence of exigent circumstances, 
police entry into a suspect's home to arrest 
him for a felony was "presumptively 
unreasonable" in the absence of a warrant. 
(Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 
587, 100 S.Ct 1371.) 
I agree with the majority that Welsh v. 
Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 
2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, wherein the high 
court concluded the warrantless arrest of a 
suspected dm& driver in his home was 
invalid, may plausibly be distinguished 
fiom the instant case on the ground the 
crime at issue in that case was not a 
jailable offense. (Maj. opn., ante, 43 
Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 756-757, 135 P.3d at pp. 
8-9; Welsh v. Wisconsin, at pp. 742, 104 
S.Ct. 2091 [emphasizing crime was "a 
nonjailable traffic offense"], 753, 104 S.Ct. 
2091 ["important factor" was "the gravity 
of the underlying offense" and that crime 
was "a noncriminal, traffic offense"].) 
But even assuming Welsh is 
distinguishable from the instant case on the 
ground that incarceration is a possible 
punishment for drunk driving in California, 
I am not persuaded police were legally 
entitled, on the facts of this case, to enter 
defendant's home against his wishes 
without a warrant. The majority concedes, 
as it must, the Fourth Amendment's 
presumptive protection of persons in their 
homes, but reasons the warrantless entry 
into this defendant's home was justified by 
exigent circumstances. Because I disagree 
such circumstances existed here, and 
because I also find the majority's attempt to 
circumscribe **I6 the sweep of its holding 
unpersuasive, I dissent. 
The ultimate standard established by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is one of reasonableness. ( 
Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 
439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706.) 
Beginning with the unassailable 
proposition that the warrantless entry by 
government agents into a person's home is " 
presumptively unreasonable " (Payton v. 
New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 587, 100 
S.Ct. 1371, italics added), courts have 
nevertheless recognized some " ' 
specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions' to the warrant requirement ( 
Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 
357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576), such 
as ' "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or 
imminent destruction of evidence, ... or the 
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the 
risk of danger to the police or to other 
persons inside or outside the dwelling" ' ( 
Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 
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100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85)." ( 
People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 
676, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.) "A 
warrantless search by the police is invalid 
unless it falls within one of the narrow and 
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement." (Flippo v. West Virginia 
(1999) 528 U.S. 11, 13, 120 S.Ct. 7, 145 
L.Ed.2d 16; People v. Whnrton (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 522, 576-577, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 
809 P.2d 290 [same].) 
***766 Once defendant demonstrated that 
police entered his home without a warrant, 
the burden shifted to the prosecution "to 
prove that the entry was nevertheless 
reasonable." (People v. Williams (1988) 
45 Caf.3d 1268, 1300, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 
756 P.2d 221.) Police admittedly did not 
have an arrest warrant permitting them to 
enter defendant's home and had been 
expressly denied consent to enter by 
defendant's housemate. (Georgia v. 
Randolph, supra, --- U.S. ----, 126 S.Ct. 
15 15.) Although the majority hints 
otherwise (maj. opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 
at p. 763, 135 P.3d at p. 14), the forced 
entry cannot be justified under the hot 
pursuit doctrine, as "there was no 
immediate or continuous pursuit ... from 
the scene of the crime." (Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 753, 104 
S.Ct 2091.) Defendant had already 
anived home, he was apparently sleeping 
in his bedroom, and police were on the 
scene; hence, "there was little remaining 
threat to the public safety." (Ibid.) 
The majority concludes the failure by 
police to obtain. a warrant before entering 
defendant's home is excused by the 
exigent-circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement. " ' " ' [Elxigent 
circ&stancesl means an emergency 
situation requiring swift action to prevent 
imminent danger or serious damage to 
property, or to forestall the imminent 
escape of a suspect or destruction of 
evidence. There is no ready litmus test for 
determining whether such circumstances 
exist, and in each case the claim of an 
extraordinary situation must be measured 
by the facts known to the officers." ' 
[Citations.] The exception is applicable to 
the federal Constitution (see "832Mincey 
v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 
2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290) and 'California 
courts are in N1 accord with the ... 
emergency exception to the warrant 
requirement.' " (People v. Wharton, supra, 
53 Cal.3d at p. 577, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 
P.2d 290.) 
"In evaluating exigency, relevant factors 
include "(1) the degree of urgency 
involved and the amount of time necessary 
to obtain a warrant; (2) reasonable belief 
that the contraband is about to be removed; 
(3) the possibility of danger to police 
officers guarding the site of the contraband 
while a search warrant is sought; (4) 
information indicating the possessors of 
the contraband are aware that the police are 
on their trail; and (5) the ready 
destructibility of the contraband and the 
knowledge 'that efforts to dispose of 
narcotics and to escape are characteristic 
behavior of persons engaged in the 
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narcotics traffic.' " ' " (People v. Gentry 
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1261-1262, 9 
Cal.Rptr.2d 742.) 
The majority locates such an emergency 
situation inside defendant's body, which 
was slowly but inexorably metabolizing 
and thus destroying the alcohol police 
believed he had consumed. The 
emergency, in other words, involved the 
potential destruction of the evidence of 
defendant's crime of drunk driving. That 
such "burn oft" occurs is undisputed. ( 
People v. Schofield (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 
968, 975, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429; see **17In 
re Martin (1962) 58 Cal.2d 509, 512, 24 
Cal.Rptr. 833, 374 P.2d 801 ["It is a 
matter of common knowledge that the 
intoxicating effect of alcohol diminishes 
with the passage of time"].) What is 
disputed is whether this natural metabolic 
process, standing alone, constitutes an 
emergency such that police may dispense 
with obtaining a warrant and immediately 
enter a person's home against his will. 
None of the cases on which the majority 
relies supports its broad conclusion that the 
natural metabolization of blood alcohol 
alone constitutes an exigent circumstance 
sufficient to permit police to enter a 
person1s***767 home against his or her 
wishes and without a warrant. For 
example, in Schmerber v. California 
(1966) 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 
L.Ed.2d 908, the United States Supreme 
Court cited the natural metabolization of a 
body's blood alcohol to justify the police 
taking a nonconsensual blood sample -from 
a suspect notwithstanding the lack of a 
search warrant. But the defendant in 
Schmerber had already been arrested and 
was in police custody, not in his home. 
Moreover, the fact of the alcohol bum off 
was just one factor the high court 
considered: "We are told that the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins 
to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as 
the body functions to eliminate it -from the 
system. Particularly in a case such as 
this, where time had to be taken to bring 
the accused to a hospital and to investigate 
the scene of the accident, there was no 
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a 
warrant. Given these special facts, we 
conclude that the attempt to secure "833 
evidence of blood-alcohol content in this 
case was an appropriate incident to 
petitioner's arrest." (Id. at pp. 770-771, 86 
S.Ct. 1826, italics added.) No such time 
pressures or "special facts" were shown in 
the instant case; indeed, police were on 
the scene just minutes after defendant 
apparently had taken his last drink. (See 
Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399 U.S. 30, 35, 
90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 [in finding 
no exigent circumstances, court 
emphasized absence of evidence showing 
that obtaining a warrant was "impracticable 
"I.) 
Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 109 
S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639, the high 
court merely recognized that "alcohol and 
other drugs are eliminated -from the 
bloodstream" (id. at p. 623, 109 S.Ct. 
1402), a point no one disputes; it did not 
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hold such elimination constituted an 
exigent circumstance entitling police to 
enter one's home without a warrant. 
Instead, the court held the warrant 
requirement was excused because the 
government's interest in regulating railway 
workers presented a special need beyond 
normal law enforcement. (Id. at p. 620, 
109 S.Ct. 1402.) 
The majority opines that "most courts have 
concluded that the dissipation of 
blood-alcohol evidence 'may constitute an 
exigent circumstance under the facts of a 
particular case.' " (Maj. opn., ante, 43 
Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 761, 135 P.3d at p. 12, 
italics added.) The qualifiers are 
important. The cases the majority cites in 
support are all distinguishable. In City of 
Orem v. Henrie (Utah Ct.App.1994) 868 
P.2d 1384, the defendant was suspected 
not only of driving while intoxicated, but 
also of leaving the scene of an accident. 
In State v. Komoto (1985) 40 Wash.App. 
200, 697 P.2d 1025, the defendant struck 
and killed a pedestrian. In both cases, the 
blood-alcohol evidence was needed to 
prosecute crimes far more serious than 
mere driving under the influence (DUI). 
The warrantless entry into a home may 
therefore have been justified. Here, by 
contrast, defendant was suspected only of 
driving while intoxicated, and at the time 
police entered his home any threat to 
public safety had ceased. 
929 F.2d 990 in support (maj. opn., ante, 
43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 761, 135 P.3d at p. 
12), but in both cases the defendants were 
lawfully arrested outside the home, at the 
scene of a traffic accident (Bohling ) or at a 
traffic stop on the highway (Reid ); their 
challenges were to the warrantless drawing 
of a blood sample. The cases thus 
presented a straightforward application of 
Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. 
757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, and 
do not support the notion that the mere 
dissipation***768 of blood-alcohol 
evidence, standing alone, creates such an 
emergency that police may enter a 
suspect's home without a warrant or 
consent. 
**I8 *834 Finally, the majority cites 
Threatt v. State (1999) 240 Ga.App. 592, 
596, 524 S.E.2d 276, but that case held, on 
facts similar to those here, that exigent 
circumstances did not, in fact, exist to 
authorize the warrantless entry to arrest for 
the crime of reckless driving. The 
Georgia appellate court then stated in 
dictum that-had officers possessed 
probable cause to arrest for DUI-the 
dissipation of evidence "may constitute an 
exigent circumstance." (Id. at p. 596, fn. 1, 
524 S.E.2d 276, italics added.) In support, 
the Threatt court cited State v. Tosar 
(1986) 180 Ga.App. 885, 888, 350 S.E.2d 
8 11, a case that did not involve entry into a 
home. 
The majority also cites State v. Bohling Invocation of the exigent-circumstances 
(1993) 173 Wis.2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 exception to the warrant requirement, 
and United States v. Reid (4th Cir.1991) moreover, must be supported by a showing 
I 
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of the "imminent destruction of evidence." 
(Minnesota v. Olson, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 
100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, italics added; see 
also Brigham City v. Stuart (May 22, 2006, 
NO. 05-502) --- U.S. ----, ---- , 126 S.Ct. 
1943, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2006 WL 1374566, 
*4 [destruction of evidence must be " 
imminent"].) The prosecution made no 
showing in this case that the delay in 
obtaining a warrant would have resulted in 
the imminent destruction, as opposed to the 
gradual and incremental degradation, of 
the alcohol in defendant's body. Indeed, a 
delay of an hour or two to obtain a warrant 
would have made little difference, for "[ilt 
is common ... for experts to take into 
account the metabolization rate of a 
substance and extrapolate from the amount 
of a substance in a blood sample to amve 
at an opinion regarding the amount of the 
substance in the blood at a critical point in 
time." (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
950, 993, 22 Cal.Rptr2d 689, 857 P.2d 
1099.) The majority disparages the 
efficacy of so-called retrograde 
extrapolation evidence, asserting such 
evidence " 'can be speculative' " (maj. 
opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 761, 135 
P.3d at p. 12), but surely it does not mean 
to suggest the admissibility of this type of 
evidence is suspect. In any event, the rule 
in this state (People v. Clark, supra, 5 
Cal.4th 950, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 
1099) and, indeed, in the majority of 
jurisdictions, is that retrograde 
extrapolation evidence is admissible, 
though of course its weight is subject to 
challenge, as are the qualifications of the 
expert witness presenting the evidence. 
(See generally Annot., Admissibility and 
Sufficiency of Extrapolation Evidence in 
DUI Prosecutions (2004) 11 9 A.L.R.5th 
379.) 
FN1. See also Vehicle Code section 
23 152, subdivision (b) which states 
in part: "In any prosecution under 
this subdivision, it is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person had 
0.08 percent or more, by weight, of 
alcohol in his or her blood at the 
time of driving the vehicle if the 
person had 0.08 percent or more, 
by weight, of alcohol in his or her 
blood at the time of the 
performance of a chemical test 
within three hours after the driving. 
3, 
To further support its contention the 
exigent-circumstances doctrine applies 
here, the majority relies on the possibility 
defendant could have corrupted the 
evidence of his alcohol consumption by 
consuming more alcohol. (Maj. opn., ante, 
43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 762, 135 P.3d at p. 
13.) But this argument proves too much, 
for the possibility exists in every case that 
a criminal suspect in his home will try to 
destroy evidence "835 of his crime. The 
drug dealer may flush his stash away, the 
bookie may burn his betting slips, the killer 
may take a metal file to the barrel of his 
gun or clean his hands of gunshot residue. 
The mere possibility a defendant may drink 
additional quantities of liquor is 
insufficient to overcome the 
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constitutionallyprotected***769 privacy 
interests of a person in his home. Instead, 
police must have articulable facts that 
would lead a reasonable officer to believe 
such destruction is about to occur. " ' " 
[Flear or apprehension alone that evidence 
will be destroyed will not justify a 
warrantless entry of a private home." 
[Citation.] Instead, "[tlhere must exist ' 
specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences ...,' 
support the warrantless intrusion." ' " ( 
People v. Gentry, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1262,9 Cal.Rptr.2d 742.) 
Vale v. Louisiana, supra, 399 U.S. 30, 90 
S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, illustrates this 
basic point of law. In that case, after 
police arrested the defendant outside a 
home, they entered the home without a 
warrant to search for drugs. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the 
search, in part, because the crime " 
involved narcotics, which are easily **I9 
removed, hidden, or destroyed. It would 
be unreasonable, the Louisiana court 
concluded, 'to require the officers under 
the facts of the case to first secure a search 
warrant before searching the premises, as 
time is of the essence inasmuch as the 
officers never know whether there is 
anyone on the premises to be search [ed] 
who could very easily destroy the evidence. 
' " (Id. at p. 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969.) The 
United States Supreme Court flatly 
rejected the state court's reasoning, 
explaining: "Such a rationale could not 
apply to the present case, since by their 
own account the arresting officers satisfied 
themselves that no one else was in the 
house when they first entered the premises. 
But entirely apart from that point, our 
past decisions make clear that only in 'a 
few specifically established and 
well-delineated' situations [citation] may a 
warrantless search of a dwelling withstand 
constitutional scrutiny." (Ibid.) Because 
there was no evidence someone was about 
to remove or destroy evidence, the high 
court held the exigent-circumstances 
exception did not apply. 
As in Vale v. Louisiana, supra, 399 U.S. 
30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, the 
prosecution in this case presented no 
evidence suggesting defendant was about 
to alter evidence of his guilt by drinking 
again. Neither Officer Gutierrez nor 
Dejohn observed defendant drinking, or 
attempting to drink, any intoxicating 
beverage. Witness Madelene Orvos 
reported that defendant had discarded an 
empty bottle of vodka. Defendant's 
housemate, Slavka Kovarick, told police 
defendant was sleeping, which was 
apparently the case until police instructed 
her to awaken him. Although the majority 
opines that "[tlhe officers had good reason 
to believe that defendant ... would ... act to 
conceal his intoxication if given the 
opportunity" (maj. opn., ante, 43 
Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 762, 135 P.3d at p. 13), 
the record confirms police possessed no 
articulable facts suggesting defendant was 
actively corrupting, or about to corrupt, the 
blood-alcohol evidence by resuming his 
consumption of alcohol. By accepting in 
support of exigency the argument "836 
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that defendant could corrupt the evidence, 
the majority converts the narrow 
exigent-circumstances exception to the 
constitutional warrant requirement into a 
free pass for police: So long as the 
destruction of evidence is possible, police 
may dispense with a warrant. But the 
possibility a suspect will destroy evidence 
exists in every case; that possibility thus 
cannot be the predicate for invoking the 
nmow exigent-circumstances exception to 
the constitutional requirement for a 
warrant. (Cf. People v. Gonzalez (1989) 
21 1 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1050, 259 Cal.Rptr. 
846 ["If specific indications of ... 
destruction of evidence were not required, 
the exigent-circumstances exception would 
entirely consume" the knock-notice 
requirement] .) 
***770 Realizing, perhaps, that none of its 
previous rationales adequately justify the 
warrantless entry, the majority suggests 
defendant had attempted to flee. (Maj. 
opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 762-763, 
135 P.3d at pp. 13-14.) This suggestion 
finds no support in the record. Officer 
Dejohn testified defendant, on learning 
police were on his doorstep, left his house 
by the back door, walked about 10 feet into 
the backyard, and then returned to the 
house. Although this caused Dejohn to be 
concerned defendant would flee, he 
admitted defendant was so intoxicated that 
he was staggering and slurring his words 
and that he immediately returned to the 
house. But even assuming defendant 
might have attempted to flee, that 
possibility did not create an emergency 
situation justifying the warrantless entry. 
Police at the scene could easily have 
detained him while they sought a warrant. 
In any event, the prosecution did not argue 
below that defendant's asserted attempt to 
flee created an emergency situation, and 
the trial court did not mention this 
circumstance. The court denied 
defendant's suppression motion solely on 
the ground that his body's metabolization 
of alcohol in his blood constituted the 
destruction of evidence. (See Lorenzana v. 
Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 
640-641, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 
[People cannot change theory on appeal of 
suppression decision].) 
Finally, the majority attempts to minimize 
the scope of its holding, explaining that it 
does not decide "that police may enter a 
home without a warrant to effect an arrest 
of a DUI suspect in every case. We hold 
merely **20 that the police conduct here, 
taking into account all of the 
circumstances, was reasonable ...." (Maj. 
opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 762, 135 
P.3d at p. 13.) I find the majority's 
attempt to circumscribe the sweep of its 
holding both unpersuasive and 
disingenuous. What are the circumstances 
in this case that make it unusual? Police 
had probable cause to believe defendant 
had recently become intoxicated and had 
driven home and that he was now inside 
his house. Police lacked both a warrant 
and consent to enter. Defendant's body was 
naturally metabolizing the alcohol, but that 
would be true in every crime involving 
alcohol. Defendant might consume 
O 2006 ThomsonNest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
I 
Page 29 of 30 
135 P.3d 3 Page 28 
38 Cal.4th 81 1, 135 P.3d 3,43 Cal.Rptr.3d 750, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 4587, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R 
(Cite as: 38 Cal.4th 811,135 P.3d 3) 
additional alcohol, thereby corrupting the 
evidence, but that. possibility, too, would 
exist in every case involving an 
alcohol-related crime. Police, in any 
event, had no articulable facts to suggest 
defendant was about to drink anything. 
Under the majority's reasoning, "837 
therefore, it would appear that any time 
police have probable cause to arrest 
someone for an alcohol-related crime (for 
which the possible penalty involves some 
jail time) and they reasonably believe the 
suspect is in his home, they may forcibly 
enter without a warrant to make an arrest 
to preserve the blood-alcohol evidence. 
One can only hope the majority's reasoning 
today is akin to "a restricted railroad ticket, 
good for this day and train only." (Smith v. 
Allwright (1944) 321 U.S. 649, 669, 64 
S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (dis. opn. of 
Roberts, J.).) 
That those enforcing our criminal laws will 
proceed vigorously is generally to society's 
benefit, but the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution places 
reasonable and recognizable limits on such 
activities. One such limit is that the 
warrantless entry into an individual's home 
is presumptively unreasonable unless 
justified by one of the narrow exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. By requiring, in 
all other situations, the interposition of the 
considered judgment of a neutral 
magistrate, the Constitution protects the 
citizenry's reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their homes. As Justice Robert 
Jackson ***771 explained: "The point of 
the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it 
denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men 
draw from evidence. Its protection 
consists in requiring that those inferences 
be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the 
officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any 
assumption that evidence sufficient to 
support a magistrate's disinterested 
determination to issue a search warrant 
will justify the officers in making a search 
without a warrant would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity and leave the 
people's homes secure only in the 
discretion of police officers. Crime, even 
in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of 
course, of grave concern to society, and the 
law allows such crime to be reached on 
proper showing. The right of officers to 
thrust themselves into a home is also a 
grave concern, not only to the individual 
but to a society which chooses to dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from 
surveillance. When the right of privacy 
must reasonably yield to the right of search 
is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or Government 
enforcement agent." (Johnson v. United 
States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 
367, 92 L.Ed. 436.) 
*838 The majority endorses a scheme 
today by which police may too easily 
evade the warrant requirement. Because I 
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conclude its reasoning and result are 
contray to the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, I dissent. 
Ca1.,2006. 
People v. Thompson 
38 Cal.4th 811, 135 P.3d 3, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 
750, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 4587, 2006 
Daily Joumal D.A.R. 6776 
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IN TFE? DlSTRTCT COURT OF THE FIRST IUDICTAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOO'mAl  
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Respondent, 1 Case No CR-2005-0019431 
1 
vs. 1 REPL YBRIEF 
1 
P E W  JEAN FINNICUM, 1 
Appellant. 
1 
- .- I 
The state has abandoned the reason initially offered as a cdtuti t)nal  excuse for entering 
the Appellant's home wiwithoul awarrmt, and now advocates aresult-oriented alternative that would 
have the Court re-create the reaiity of what occurred The pol~ce oficms involved did not arrest the 
Appellant when they entered her home. They were still invesligating the case. Once she was 
removed from her home she was forced to perform field sobriety evaluations and submit to a breath 
test at the threat of the loss of her license. If probable cause existed form mest prim to entry inlo 
hcr home, as the state now contends, then she should have been told she was under arrest, at which 
I point she was entitled to be told she had the right to an attorney, the right to remain silent and the 
I 
7X NO. : 2086643644 
right in refuse to allswer the officer's quest~ons. Thc state's position, if accepied by i11e Court, 
allows the state the freedom to make a warrantless entry into a home under a prohble cause to 
arresffexigent circucnstances theory made up afler the fact, and at the same time ignore the 
constitutional protections available to one aocusod of a crime. Such an in~o~~gruous result should 
not he allowed, and the Court should simply ref7~1sc to engage in the almost mystical distinctions 
between "reasonable, articulablc suspicion of' criminal activity" and "probable cime" to arrest. 
The fact is that the police did not onter the Appcllant'shome to arrest her. They entered her 
bume, based upon a Tery  style stop to continue their investigation. As the state now concedes 
Tdnho law does not allow police entry into the home to effect u Terry seizure, and this warmnt1es.s 
entry was therefore unconstitutional. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CEKTTFTCA'E, OF SERVICE 
T hereby certrtify that on the .IT day of December, 2006, a tnle and correct copy af the 
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Prosecuting Attorney's Otzce, at 446-1833. 
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17:OO:OO 
Recording Started: 
17:OO:OO 
Case called 
17:00:31 Judge: Luster, John 
Calls case - PA Ann Wick, DA Fred Loats present 
for argument on appeal 
Court Minutes Session: LUSTER020107P 
Other: Fred Loats, DA 
Ready 
Other: Ann Wick, PA 
Ready 
Judge: Luster, John 
I have reviewed briefing 
Other: Fred Loats, DA 
Officers responded to a call re: argument 
between son and mother (my client) 
argument was about her drinking. At that time 
Def drove up - brief contact 
wth her -told her to drive further up the drive 
way and to step out of the 
vehicle and stay there. He spoke to son - she 
went into her home. TWO 
offices went inside her house and took her 
outside and continued with DUI 
investigation. I challenge the entry into the 
liome. The state's position 
now is that they had probable cause so no need 
to worry about Terry or Maland 
or exigent circumstances. 116 SCt. 1667 Page 
166 1 Maland says you can't do 
that (enter the home) to make the arrest. The 
officers didn't arrest her 
when they went into the home. They did take her 
into custody. 
Judge: Luster, John 
There are minutes in the file of Judge 
Friedlander intidcating probable cause 
to arrest -the minutes don't reflect "exigent 
circumstances." 
Other: Fred Loats, DA 
There was no additional evidence taken. I don't 
recall if she discussed 
exigent circumstances or not. 
Judge: Luster, John 
The only thing in the court log is one line - 
"find PC for DUI' I'm not sure 
that is part of the appellate record. Arguing 
Court Minutes Session: LUSTER020107P Page 13, ... 
PC is argument in futility - 
17:09:33 state will argue yes and I'll argue no. The 
order to continue to drive is 
17:09:57 inconsistent with believing she was DUI. When 
they removed her from the home 
17:10:15 they questioned her about what had happened. 
They didn't tell her those 
17:10:49 things (rights)because they didn't think she 
was DUI. The case should be 
7 I : 2 strictly analyzed under Maland. - this is 
directly on point. 
17:11:57 Other: Ann Wick, PA 
Appropriate to look at how we got where we did. 
He's raised the issue under 
17:12: 16 lower court re: Maiand and that's where all the 
arguments stem fiom and have 
17:12:27 him arguing Maland vs. what my brief is - I  
don't think that Maland is 
17:12:50 controlling. Judge found the stop was 
effectuated outside the home. She was 
17: 13: 17 told to sit on the bench outside the home and 
she did this for a short time 
17: 132 1 and then she went inside the home. The police 
did not enter the home to 
17:13:42 effectuate a Terry stop. 
17:14,57 Judge: Luster, John 
Questions PA re: difference in case and Maland 
17:15.19 Other: Ann Wick, PA 
The Terry stop is a seizure - we're looking at a 
warrantless entry into a hom 
17: 16 49 loolc at exigent circumstances exception. 
17: 19:41 Judge: Luster, John 
There is no evidence of any violence -just that 
the argument was over the 
17:19:58 mother drinking and possibly driving. 
17:20:22 Othcr: Ann Wick, PA 
The second officer who arrived is not the one 
who was talking to the son 
17:20:38 and didn't have full information -only the 
domestic disturbance report and 
17:2 1 :01 some ofwhat the first officer knows. 
Court M~nutes Session LUSTER020107P Page 14, .. 
Judge: Luster, John 
I'm not sure Judge Friedlander evaluated the 
case it1 the same fashion you 
have and I dont' think I saw anything in the 
record that any officer was 
concerned about losing evidence and obtaining a 
warrant. 
Other: Ann Wick, PA 
The lower court was dealing with issues as 
represented by the parties -that 
doesn't inhibit the court from ruling on the 
Magistrate decision as argued 
Sufficient facts on the record that exigent 
circ~inistances apply 
Judge: Luster, John 
The state did not come forward and put evidence 
on the record re: exigent 
circumstances. No problem with your legal 
analysis. Welch case is no longer 
controlling due to law changing State v. Fees 
is controlling 
Other: Fred Loats, DA 
Judge Friedlander based her decision on the Fees 
issue. State v. Jenkins 
didn't change her mind in Motion for 
reconsideration. Zuniga - court of 
appeals decision re: seizure remarkably 
siniilar to ours - 
Judge: Luster, John 
Recess to review language in one of the cases. 
Stop recording 
Recording Started: 
Record 
FINNICUM, PEGGY JEAN 
Judge: Luster, John 
Baclc in session - dealing with a Magistrate 
division appeal -re: appeal 
Court Minutes Session: LUSTER020107P Page 15, 
standards - facts are basically undisputed - 
the findings of the Magistrate 
ae very limited in this case and this is 
problematic. The matter came on 
befoe the Magistrate for Reconsideration and the 
motion was denied - the 
record is somewhat limited. I see that the 
Judge found probable cause 
without other findings. State v. Maland 
application issue - I respectfully 
disagree with her conclusion - the real question 
is warrantless entry into 
the home. There must be probable cause and 
exigent circumstances. Conclude 
that a criminal act justifying entry into a home 
misdemeanor DUI clearly 
qualifies as a serious offense. Next there must 
be probable cause - 
objective standard - Judge Friedlander didn't 
iteniize the reasons for finding 
PC. The evidence that the court would have to 
consider is collective 
informaton of officers before entry into the 
home. Son's information was 
corroborated to some extent when the defendant 
arrived and officers saw 
slurred speach, eyes glossy, odor of alcohol. 
The officer did articulate on 
2 occasions that he told defendant that he felt 
she was under the influence - 
not that he suspected it. His wanting additonal 
evidence does not diminish. 
that opinion. The purpose on appeal is if there 
is sufficient findings on 
the record from the Magistrate that the officer 
had PC. I am prepared to 
find that the officer had PC. The next prongis 
exigent circumstances - the 
one the officer indicated is officer safety. 
The facts of that in this case 
is simply lacking. The Supreme Court decided on 
a case this week - name 
~~nltnown - re Officers Safety. Call was as to a 
domestic disturbance - when 
they got there and spoke to the son it was 
different - that there was a 
Court Minutes Session LUSTER020107P Page 16, ... 
heated argument over her drinking habits. 
Exigent circumstances not 
justified. PA Swenson argued destruction of 
evidence. I found this 
interesting that they made no effort to knock on 
the door and ask her to come 
out - they simply walked into the home. There 
was no testimony about the 
officers concern of alcohol blood level drop, 
undue delay in obtaining a 
warrant, more alcohol in the house or officer's 
concern. The district court 
lnust determine that the record shows sufficient 
finding to support - they 
were simply not advanced. It is clearly the 
burden of the state to establish 
the appropriate - did re: PC but not as to 
exigent circumstances. REVERSE 
THE DECISION OF MAGISTRATE DIVISION AND REMAND 
BACK DA to submit order 
Other: Fred Loats, DA 
1'11 do so 
17:58:20 Other: Ann Wick, PA 
1s tlle court not'finding state v. Cooper that 
the exigent circumstances of 
17:58:59 blood alcohol is sufficient? 
1759: 12 Judge: Luster, John 
There needs to be something for the record and 
exigent circumstances needs to 
17:59:26 be more than blood alcohol level 
18:00:00 Stop recording 
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ANN WICK 
n\i THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 CASE NO. CR05-19431 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
vs. 1 OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
1 ORDER ON APPEAL 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 1 
1 
Defendant. 
ANN WICK, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, hereby objects to 
Defendant's proposed Order on Appeal, for the following reasons: 
1. Defendant's proposed order does not clearly set forth the findings made by the Court 
on the record on February 1,2007. Without at least a summary of the Court's 
findings and conclusions on the record, in the absence of a transcript of the appeal 
hearing, the magistrate court is given no guidance as to what proceedings are 
appropriate on remand. 
2. Defendant's proposed order does not accurately reflect the Court's order to remand. 
The Court reversed the magistrate court's decision denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress and remanded this case to the Magistrate's Division for further proceedings 
consistent with the Court's decision. To the best of the undersigned counsel's 
recollection, the Court did not order that the Judgment and Sentence in this case be 
set aside. Nor did the Court remand the case with specific instmctions for the 
magistrate court to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Accordingly, the State requests the Court sign the State's proposed Order on Appeal, 
which is attached. In the alternative, a hearing is requested in order for the State to present oral 
argument in support of this Objection. If such hearing is granted, the State expects oral argument 
to take approximately fifteen minutes. 
"J 
Dated this $- day of a- ,2007. 
/ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the& day of _FA. , 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ORDER was sent first class mail to : 
Fred Loats, Attorney for Defendant 
Fax: 208-664-3644 
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STATE OF IDAHO, iTJ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaiilti,fT, 1 Case No. CR-2005-001943 I 
1 
VS. ) , MOTION FOR R;FCONSIDERATlON 
1 NOTICE OF HENUNG 
PEGGY JEAN PlNNICO'M, ) 
1 
Defendant. 1 
Defendant hereby moves the Court for reconsideration of its decisicm denying the 
Defendant's Moljon to Suppress, upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying 
Memorandum. , , 
Counsel intend9 lo call this Motion on for hea~ing on 2hc. 2 12: day of February, 2006 at h e  
hour nT8:30 o'clock a.m., the time set for Calendar Call, or at such othertime ~ls the Courlmay set 
, . 
, , 
or allow. I . : :  . :  _ .  
., . . . .. 
Counsel requests the opportunity to make oral argument .i. . in , : support .. ofthis Motion. 
, . 
,.( .,.: p i :  
MOTrON FOR ROCC0NJrUEHH4TI0N, 
NOTICE 0FHEAR1,'NT: 1 
ROM :FRED LOQTS OFFICE FQX NO. : 
DATED this day &February, 2006. 
~Ggrney for Defendant 
.. . 
. . 
,. , 
. . .  
I hereby ccrtiiy that on the 3 day of February, 2006, a true and cormd copy of the 
forcgo~ng was sewed upon counsel For the statc, by sending the same by Wx to the Kootenai County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, at 4446- 1833. A 
Attorney for Drferuiant 
, . 
. , I  .. . i?. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION, 
NOTICE OFHEAHINC: 2 
ROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. : 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
Alforncry at Law 
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ISB No. 2147 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY P I  XOOTEYA}~S 
FILED: 
Attorney for Defendant 
(N TIE DISTRICT COURT OF 'SHE FmST JTJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF DAHO, ) 
) 
Plaint i fi; 1 Case No. CR-2005-001943 I 
vs 
1 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
1 MOTION FOR MCONSIDEKATZON 
PEGGY JEAN FINNTCUM, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
In its decision, the Court found that a ''Teri-y" stop had occurred outside the Defendant's 
rcsidcnce, and therefore the decision in State v. Maland was distinguishable from the facts of this 
case, and that w e v ,  Manthei, allowing police entry into n home to complete a "Terry" stop, was 
In California v. ., 499 1J.S. 621, 1 1 1 S.Ct. 1547 (1991). the Court held .that a 
"seizure" within "the m.eaning ol'the Foc~rih Amendment", did hot.':dccur until the defen.danl had 
actually been taken into physical police custody. 'The defendant was among a group of young men 
. . 
that "scattered" upon seeing a poi~oe car. The police gave chase. During the chase, the ciefe~~dant 
?OM : FRED LORTS OFFICE 
discarded a package which lafer turned out to contain LTW~ cocaine. ,The officer then tackled the 
defendant. E,k later filed a Motion to Suppress, contending that hh had been "seized'" under the 
Fourth Amendment when pursued by the police (and presumiibly to stop). The state conceded 
. ,  , 
that the oftrcers laclced the reasonable suspicion necessary for ileditimate Torry stop. Tho Comt 
held that no seizurc for Fourth Amendment purposes occiured until tho defendant way a~3ually 
physically taken into police custody ("seized"), and therefore it was unnecctsaiyto consider whether 
the police had constitutional grounds to chase the defendant, as the crack cocaine, discarded in 
flight, was not acquired by the police as the rcsult of an unconstitutional "seizure." 
"Thc narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with 
respect to application of physical force, aseizure occurs even thoughthe subject does not yield. We 
hold that it does not." California d d a r i  D., 11 1 S.Ct. 1547 at 1550. 
Application ofpodarito the facts ofthiv case leads to the ctbnclusion that no '"sei!zure" of 
Mrs. Finnicum occurred until &er the police entered her home and escorted her back oulside. In 
other words, no "Twry" stop was effectuated outside the home, thereby bringing this cave within 
the ruling of the Court in Btate v. Mak& and outside the parameters of State v. .-, if that 
case is still good law. A seizure does not occur, under the Fourth Amendment, when thc "subject 
does not yield." Mrs. Finnicum did not yield, but walked inside her home. Under the definition of 
I . ,  . . 
"seizure" given in t h e m c a s e ,  no Terry stop was "effectuated" until the police walked inside 
i .: 
, . 
her home and physically escorted her out. Maland held such an entry is unconstitutional, md 
therefore the Motion to Supprcss should have been granted. 
Tt is therefore respectfully requested that the: Court reconsider its earlier decision and grant 
MEMORAM,rIM INSUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDEHATION 2 
RON :FRED LORTS OFFICE FR>< NO. : 
. . 
. . the Motion to Suppmss ,filed heroin. . ~ , . .  . 
Q3RWlCAT'E% OF SERVICE 
Attorney for Defendant 
I hereby certify that on the 1 day o f  February. 2006, a true and conect cupy of the 
forego~ng was served upon cou~lsel for the state, by sending the same by fax lo the Kootenai County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, at 446-1 833. 
MEMORdNnrl&f INS'UPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RIZCONSLDERATJON 3 
FROM :FF?ED LORTS OFFICE FRX NO. :2086643644 ;b. 05 2007 01:46PM PI 
FRE'DERTCK a LUATS 
Attornqy m Law 
,111 North 2nd Sweet 
1'. 0. Box 831 
Cwur d'Alene,lL) 83HI4 
lklcphone (208)667-6424 
Fax: (208)664-3644 
ISB No. 2147 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
IN I'IIE DISTRICT COURT OF W, FIRST JUDJCIAL DISTRTCT CIX: nB 
STATE3 OF lDAIiO, M AND FOR T m  COUNTY OF KOOThiAI 
STAm OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Case No. CR-2005-0019431 
1 
vs. j ORDER ON APPEAL 
PEWY JEAN F W C U M ,  
I 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
L
Oral argument in this matter was heard on February I. ,  2007. After considering the 
armments of oounsel, the Brief$ filed, m d  the reoord on appeal, the Court having announced its 
Pindings of Fact and ConoIusj,ons of Law on the record ar the conclusion 0.f oral argument, 
SS IS HEREBY ORDERED that che Judgment and Senktloc entered in the above entitled 
action be ma ted  and set asidide, and the Order Denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress be 
reversed, and mamr remandcd to Magistrate's Division with instructions to gran.t the Defendant's 
Motion to Supprcss and for such further prooeedings consixtent with the Court's decision reversing 
tho Order Denying the Motion to Suppress. 
Received Feb-05-07 02:57um From-20866A36AA To-JUDGE LUSTER 
FROM :FRED LOATS OFFICE FRX NO. : 2086643644 ab. 05 2007 01:46PM P2 
4P Dated this?... day of  Pebrunry, 2007, 
DI.drIct Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCl3 1 
1 hereby certify that a trw copy of the 
fax to the o f i m  of the Kuotcnai County 
Lon&, attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
) CASE NO. C'RO5-19431 
Plaintiff, 
VS. ) ORDER ON APPEAL 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 
) 
Defendant. ) 
The Court heard oral argument in the above-entitled case on Defendant's appeal of the 
magistrate court's decision denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress on February 1,2007. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Court announced its decision reversing the magistrate court's 
decision on the record and remanded the case to the Magistrate's Division for M h e r  
proceedings. So that the magistrate court has some guidance as to what further proceedings are 
appropriate on remand, the Court now summarizes its decision on the record as follows: 
The issue before the Court on appeal was whether or not the warrantless entry into Ms. 
Finnicum's house by law enforcement fell within a well-recognized exception to the general 
Constitutional warrant requirement. The State argued that said entry fell within the exigent 
circumstances exception, based both on a concern that Defendant would be able to obtain a 
weapon from within the home and on the dissipating nature of blood alcohol content evidence. 
While this Court does find that driving under the influence is clearly a serious offense for 
purposes of applying the exigent circumstances analysis to a case involving evanescent evidence, 
and that evanescent evidence could present an exigent circumstance, this Court cannot find that 
the exigent circumstances exception has been factually supported in the present case. 
Specifically, the record contains no evidence as to the time it would have taken to get a search 
warrant for Ms. Finnicum's home, the possible presence of alcohol in the home, or the problems 
presented by waiting for a search warrant to be obtained. Furthermore, the facts known to the 
officers when they gained entry into Ms. Finnicum's house are insufficient to support a finding 
of exigency based on a weapons concern. 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated on the record on February 1,2007, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the magistrate court's decision denying Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress is reversed, and that the matter is remanded to the Magistrate's Division for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
Dated this!@?ay of F&ruar, \, ,2007. 
The Honorable John P. Luster 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herby certify that on day of February, 2007, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed / delivered by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, interoffice mail, hand delivered, or 
faxed to: 
Frederick G. Loats 
Attorney for Defendant 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
Fax: 446-1 833 
Fax: 664-3644 
STATE OFIDAHO 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, .Criminal Law Division 
REBEKAH A. CUDE 
ldaho State Bar # 5256 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaha 83720-001 0 . 1% * 
(208) 334-4534 - - 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR KOOTENAI COUNN 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, j NO. CR 2005-001 9431 
1 
vs. i 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PEGGY J W N  FINNICUM, 1 
Defendant-Respondent. 
i 
) 
) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, PEGGY JE%N FINNICUM, 
AND FREDERICK G. LOATS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.O. BOX 831, COEUR 
D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 .  The State of ldaho appeals against the above-named respondent, 
Peggy Jean Finnicum, to the ldaho Supreme Court from the Order On Appeal 
entered in the above-entitled action on February 12, 2007, and the Order On 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page I 
Appeal entered in the above-entitled action on February 26, 2007, the Honorable 
Judge John Patrick Luster, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, 
and the orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under 
ldaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(10). 
3. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript, in compressed form as described in I.A.R. 26(m): 
a) The hearing on appeal before the district court on February 1, 2007. 
4. The appellant requests the following document be included in the 
clerks record, in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28: 
a) The transcript of the hearings on the motion to suppress held in 
this case on December 15,2005 and February 3, 2008, which 
have already been prepared as one volume and submitted and 
considered by the district court at the 2/1/07 hearing on appeal. 
5. 1 certify that: 
a) A copy of this notice of appeal is being served on the reporter; 
b) The appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the State of ldaho is the 
appellant (Idaho Code 5 31-3212); 
c) There is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a 
criminal case, I.A.R. 23(a)(8); 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 
d) That arrangements have been made with the Kootenai County 
Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the 
reporter's transcript;: 
e) Service is being made upon all parties as required by I.A.R. 20. 
6. The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in reversing 
the magistrate's denial of Rnnicum's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 23* day of March, 2007. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for the Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 1 have this 23rd day of March, 2007, caused a 
true and correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
FREDERICK G. LOATS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 831 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
WILLIAM A. RUSH 
COURT REPORTER 
KOOTENAI COUNTY 
P.O. BOX 9000 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-9000 
WILLIAM J. DOUGLAS 
KOOTENAI COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
P.O. BOX 9000 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 8381 6-9000 
THE HONORABLE JOHN P. LUSTER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUDGE 
P.O. BOX 9000 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-9000 
HAND DELIVERY 
MR. STEPHEN KENYON 
CLERK OF THE COURTS 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-01 01 
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STATE OF IDAHO) 
County of Kooienai)ss 
/ 
FfLEO: 41- 9 -%: 
A! o'clock- 
CLERK, DlSTRlCTAURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CR05-19431 
Plaintiff, 1 
) REM ITTITUR 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM, 1 
Defendant. 1 
\ 
The appeal court having rendered it's decision and the time for appeal having 
expired now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the same is hereby remanded to the Magistrate 
Division for such further proceedings as may be necessary. 
DATED this li,qthday of Mod,  ,2007 
I?&& 
District Judge 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, on the day d&WiL ,2007, to the following: 
Honorable Penny Friedlander 
Magistrate 
FAX 446-1 188 
KCPA 
FAX 446-1 833 
Fred Loats 
FAX 664-3644 
DAN ENGLISH, Clerk of Court 
Ash- ~3~44.4~ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
I STATE OF IDAHO, 
I Plaintiff, 
PENNY JEAN FINNICUM, 
I Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR-05-19431 
ORDER RESCINDING REMITTITUR 
The District Court issued its Remittitur on March 29, 2007 after 
ruling on appeal from the Magistrate Division. A Notice of Appeal from 
the District Court's decision was filed on March 23, 2007, however that 
Notice had not been placed in the court file. 
Therefore it is  hereby ordered that  the Remittitur remanding the 
matter to the Magistrate Division is rescinded. 
Dated this 5th day of April, 2007 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
interoffice, or faxed on the 5'h day of April, 2007, to the following: 
Honorable Penny Friedlander 
Magistrate 
FAX: 446-1 188 
KCPA 
FAX: 446-1833 
Fred Loats 
FAX: 664-3644 
Dan English 
Clerk of the Court 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JTJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) SUPREME COURT 
Plaintiff/Respondent ) CASE NUMBER 
) 34087 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM ) 
Defendant/Appellant ) 
I CINDY O'REILLY Clerk of the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Kootenai, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this 
cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, 
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents 
requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
I further certify that the following will be submitted as 
exhibits to this Record on Appeal: 
TRANSCRIPT: MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND DECISION FILED 9/14/06 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT #1 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this 5TH day of JUNE 2007. 
Clerk of the District Court 
DAN ENGLISE. 
Clerk's Certificate 
By: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
State of Idaho 1 SUPREME COURT #34087 
PlaintifflRespondent 1 
1 CASE #CR05-1943 1 
1 
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
VS 1 
1 
1 
1 
PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM 1 
DefendantIAppellant 1 
I, Cindy O'Reilly, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District 
Of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of Clerk's Record to 
each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
FREDERICK LOATS Mr. Lawrence Wasden 
ATTORNEY AT LAW Attorney General 
111 ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ t  State of Idaho 
PO BOX 83 1 700 W. Jefferson 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814 Suite 210 
Boise ID 83720-0010 
Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Respondent 
IN WITNESS ave hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
Said Court this@ d , 2 0 0 8  
Dan English 
Clerk of District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
